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TORT LIABILITY FOR STRIKES IN CANADA :
SOME PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL
WORKMANSHIP*
H. W . ARTHURS t
Toronto

I. Introduction .

Recognition of the social utility and, indeed, of the necessity of trade unions implies acceptance of the economic and
social pressure that can come from united action . Such acceptance does not solve all difficulties ; it leaves open the
most troublesome of all questions-the questions of how
far and when .'

That legislatures in Canada, since at least the 1940's, have recognized trade unions and embraced collective bargaining as
essential industrial policy is trite. The impact of this embrace
upon the legality of "economic and social pressures" is the theme
of this inquiry.
The lusty and forgivable infant that was trade unionism fifteen
years ago has developed in public, legislative, and judicial imagery, into a churlish adolescent . Canadian courts are thus con
fronted with the unenviable task of working within a legislative
framework adopted in one era, on the basis of sentiments of a
later day, and the common-law precedents of an earlier one. The
fact that the legislation is American in origin and that the common law is English while the attitudes are peculiarly Canadian
complicates matters still further . It is the interaction of legislation, common law, and attitudes that is the measure of tort liability for strikes.
*Insofar as an understanding of judicial techniques is to emerge from
this article, organization in the categories developed by the decisions is
dictated. It is thus necessary to disappoint the reader who ponders the
status of the economic, jurisdictional, recognition, makework, or secondary strike, and to burden him with causes of action for breach of statute,
conspiracey, and interference with legal rights .
tH.' W . Arthurs, LL.B . (U . of T.), LL.M . (Harvard) .
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930), p. 204 .
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The techniques and philosophies which determine liability
may appear through consideration of the early common law, the
nature of collective bargaining legislation, and the tort doctrines
currently employed by the courts-actions for breach of a statute,
civil conspiracy, and intentional interference with another's
rights . To the extent to which these doctrines are unsatisfactory,
an interesting experiment in industrial self-government through
compulsory arbitration will be explored. Finally, an attempt will
be made to assess the compatibility of the case law and the scheme
of industrial relations as it exists, and as contemplated by the
legislation.
II . The Strike at Common Law Before the Labour Relations
Acts.

It is not atypical of the attitude of nineteenth century Canadian
lawyers that strikes, if not illegal, were nonetheless pernicious .

The strikers must thus necessarily . . . fail to obtain any enduring
fruit of the struggle and privation they have borne with so much
cheerfulness and, withal, moderation . To annul permanently the effects of an economic law as infallible in its operation as any physical
law, may well be deemed a hopeless undertaking.2
Nonetheless, by 1898 the Supreme Court of Canada was ready

to concede that, absent illegal means, union men might concertedly cease to work to prevent the employment of non-union men.
In Perrault v. Gauthier,' Girouard r., in reaching this result, relied heavily upon Allen v. Flood,4 especially the judgment of Lord
Herschell

It would have been perfectly lawful for all the ironworkers to leave
their employment and not to accept a subsequent engagement to
work in the company of the plaintiffs. . . . It is not for your Lordships
to express any opinion on the policy of trade unions . . . .e
A man's right to work or not to pursue a particular trade or calling
or to determine when or where or with whom he will work, is in law
a right of precisely the same nature, and entitled to just the same protection as a man's right to trade or work . They are but examples of
that wider right . . . of free speech . A man has a right to say what he
pleases, to induce, to advise, to exhort, to command, provided he
does not slander or deceive or commit any other of the wrongs known
to the law of which speech may be the medium .
2 Gordon, Strikes and Strikers in Their Legal Aspects (1883), 3 Can.
L.T. 367, at p. 373 .
3 (1898), 28 S.C.R. 241 .
4 [1898) A.C. 1 ; the cases seem to have been heard concurrently, and
the concurring opinion of Taschereau J. seems to have been written before
the decision in Allen v. Flood was reported .
a Ibid., at p. 129.
s Md. : at p. 138 . Cf. Rand, Responsibilities of Labour Unions, Special
Lectures, Law Society of Upper Canada (1954), p. 38.
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By 1908, the Privy Council, in Jose v. Metallic Roofing, rejected the notion that strikes were per se illegal. The trial judge
was held to have misdirected the jury in telling them that
The calling out of the men on strike by resolutions of the unions, if
those resolutions were the cause of the strike, was an actionable
wrong, without regard to motive, and without regard to the conspiracy alleged .'

Again, in LL. G. W. U. v. Rother, the right to strike was euphemistically propounded
I will concede the right of the employees to strike. I will concede the
right of the Union to peacefully promote the success of such strike . . . . $

and :

A man may work when and for whom he chooses, and for what wage
and under what conditions as to him seems best . . . I should say a
man had a right to advise another to leave the employment of his
employer, provided he left such employment with due regard to the
law governing the relations of employer and employeee 9

Nonetheless, strikes whatever their purpose-despite dicta to
the contrary"-were found actionable with mysterious constancy.
The usual grounds of liability were (i) conspiracy to injure," and
' [1908] A .C . 514, at p . 518 .
8 (1923), 34 K .B. 69 (Que. C .A .), at p . 70, per Martin J . Just what
Martin J . had in mind was revealed by his statement that "If members of
labour Unions prefer idleness to employment, that is their affair, and so
long as they do not attempt to interfere with men who are willing to work
or with the business of employers . . . no one is likely to interfere with
them ." Ibid., at p . 72 .
9 Ibid., at p . 74, per Greenshields J.
x° Obiter dicta indicating a right to strike : Hynes v . Fisher (1883), 4
O .R . 60 ; Perrault v . Gauthier (1898), 28 S .C.R . 241 ; Krug Furniture v.
Berlin etc . Woodworkers (1903), 5 O .L .R . 463 ; Cotter v. Osborne (1906),
5 W.L.R . 14 (Man .) ; Lefebvre v . Knott (1907), 32 S .C . 441 (Que .) ; Graham
v. Bricklayers' Union (1908),9 W .L .R . 475 (B.C.) ; Jose v. Metallic Roofing,
[1908] A .C . 514 (P .C .) ; Vulcan Iron Works v. Winnipeg Lodge 174 (1911) .
21 Man . R. 473 (C.A .) ; Sleuter (Slenter) v. Scott (1915), 22 D.L .R. 900
(B .C.) ; Loc . Union 1562, U.M. W.A . v . Williams and Rees (1919), 59 S .C .R .
240 ; Rex v . Russell, [19201 1 W .W.R . 624 (Man . C.A .) ; Chase v. Starr,
[192313 W.W.R . 500 (Man . C .A.) ; I.L . G.W.U. v. Rother, [1923] 3 D .L .R .
768 (Que . C.A .) ; Johnston v . Mackey, [1937] 1 D .L .R. 443 (N .S .C.A.) ;
Lupovich v . Shane, (194413 D .L.R . 193 (Que . S .C .) .
u Liability for strikes in conspiracy : (a) Recovery by the employer :
Vulcan Iron Works v . Winnipeg Lodge 174 ; Cotter v. Osborne ; Krug
Furniture v. Berlin etc . Woodworkers, ibid. ; but see contra : Hay v. Local
Union, [1929] 2 D.L .R. 336 (Ont . C.A .) ; Jose v . Metallic Roofing, ibid. ;
Mitchell v. Woods (1906), 4 . W .L.R . 371 (B .C.) (blacklisting by employers
of striking employees not actionable conspiracy). (b) Recovery by workmen : Sleuter (Slenter) v. Scott ; Loc . 1562 U.M. W.A . v. Williams c& Rees ;
Johnston v . Mackey, ibid. ; but see contra : Perrault v. Gauthier, ibid. ;
Corbett v . Canadian National Printing Trades, [1943] 4 D .L.R . 441 (Alta .
C .A.) ; Graham v . Bricklayers, ibid. (refusal to admit to union membership
not conspiracy) .
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(ii) inducing breach of contract." No wonder, then, that one
writer felt constrained to remark that :
[In 19391 existing legislation and court decisions relative to strikes
and picketing made it fairly clear that any union activity that was
likely to be effective . . . would subject the participants to both criminal and civil penalties .1
3

It is against this common-law background in the era before
the passage of compulsory collective bargaining statutes that the
civil liability for strikes must be understood in the post-statute
era . This much, at least, appears from the dicta in the cases : absent a nominate tort (e.g. assault, procuring breach, defamation),
absent a criminal act, absent an intent to injure, strikes might
lawfully be waged or threatened in furtherance of some legitimate
economic interest . 14 Those interests sometimes considered legitimate included higher wages," a union shop," the nonemployment of persons with whom the union did not wish to work,,-'
and assistance to fellow-unionists engaged in some legitimate
dispute." Political strikes were beyond the pale," as were gratuitous demonstrations of force," or strikes calculated to injure an
employer in the carrying on of his business, by interfering with his
contracts with employees or customers or jurisdictional strikes
These categories of lawfulness and unlawfulness obviously overlap and lose their meaning.
Although these cases have seldom reappeared in recent years,
they are skeletons in our closet of which the judges and the parties
are all aware. Their influence is largely felt because the courts
continue, even today, to resort to the hoary English "freedom of
,21

.22

12 Liability for strikes for procuring breach : Hynes v. Fisher, ,-bid. (injunction refused : "dirty hands") ; Le Rol Mining Co . v . Rossland Miners'
Union (1901), 8 B.C.R. 370 ; Brauch v . Roth (1904), 10 O.L.R. 284 ; Small
v. A .F. of M. (1903), 2 O.W.R. 33 ; Klein v . Jenovese & Parley, [1932]
O.R. 504 (C.A.).
13 Laskin, Recent Labour Legislation in Canada (1944), 22 Can . Bar
Rev. 776, at p. 780.
Supra, footnote 10.
Vulcan Iron Works v . Winnipeg Lodge, supra, footnote 10, at p. 477,
per Mathers J.
16 Loc . 1562, U.M. W.A . v . Williams & Rees, supra, footnote 10, at p.
247, per Duff J. (dissenting on this ground) .
17 Perrault v. Gauthier ; Corbett v. C.N.P. T. U., supra, footnote 10 ; but
see contra : Loc . 1562, U.M. W.A . v . Williams & Rees ; Sleuter (Sleuter)
v. Scott ; Johnston v . Mackey, supra, footnote 10.
Krug Furniture v . Berlin etc . Woodworkers, supra, footnote 10 .
Rex v . Russell, supra, footnote 10.
Loc . 1562, U.M. W.A . v. William s & Rees, supra, footnote 10.
21 Supra, footnote 12.
22 Johnston v . Mackey, supra, footnote 10.
14
16

1s
1s
26
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trade" cases upon which the early Canadian common law of
strikes was based. 23
The passage of compulsory collective bargaining legislation 24
has drastically altered the daily conduct of labour relations, but
its impact upon the common law has been rather less spectacular.
It can best be seen by analyzing the structure and terms of the
legislation and tracing doctrinal developments since it came into
effect .
III . Legislation Affecting the Legality of Strikes."

All ten Canadian provinces (together with the federal government, insofar as its legislative authority extends) 2s have Labour
Relations Acts which declare the right of employees to join unions and participate in their lawful activities.
The Acts generally" provide that there shall be no strike during the currency of a collective agreement . Furthermore, a union
is required to obtain the right to bargain collectively (i.e. become
certified) and, in fact, resort to the bargaining process as a condition precedent to the legality of a strike under the legislation.28
The bargaining process, whether for an initial contract or upon
renewal or renegotiation of an existing contract, involves resort
to conciliation or mediation by the Department of Labour, and
the issuing of a report and recommendations by the conciliation
authority, in advance of which a strike is, again, illegal." In three
jurisdictions" a vote on the award may be part of this procedure .
In four jurisdictions," a strike vote of the employees involved is
interposed as a further condition precedent. In summary, before
striking, unions must become entitled to bargain, must bargain,
23 See Kennedy and Finkelman, The Right to Trade (1930), for a review
of the English authorities, and the appendix therein for the derivative
Canadian cases .
24
Beginning with the Collective Bargaining Act of Ontario, S .O ., 1943,
c. 4 .
25 A s
of March Ist, 1960.
25 For
an analysis of the constitutional barriers to national labour
legislation, see Logan, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective
Bargaining (1956), pp . 3-6 ; Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (1951),
p . 281 ; and see Reference Re Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act, [1955] S .C .R. 529 . The federal legislation parallels the Ontario Act
in all sections here relevant .
27 Except for Alberta and Saskatchewan .
23 Except for Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan .
29 But see R .S .P.E .I ., 1951, c . 164, s . 13, providingthatresort to arbitration under the Arbitration Act is a condition precedent to strike, and that
Her Majesty is a party to every arbitration .
R.S .A., 1955, c . 167, s . 104 (am . 1957, c . 38, s . 40) ; S .B .C., 1954,
i 30
c. 17, ss. 18-19 ; R.S .N .S ., 1954, c . 295, s . 24(2) .
31 R.S .A., 1955, c . 167, s . 94(4) ; S .B .C ., 1954, c. 17, s . 50 ; R.S .N.S.,
1954, c . 295, s . 24(3) ; R .S .P.E.I., 1951, c. 164, s . 20 (am .) .
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must resort to the governmental agency in aid of bargaining, and
-frequently-must confirm by vote that further bargaining is
so fruitless as to render a strike more desirable. Several Acts provide for administrative or judicial declarations of illegal strikes,
presumably to inform the parties and the public of non-compliance with the Act.32 All provide-for prosecution, summary conviction, and penalties for illegal strikes, both for the striking union and for individual employees. It will be noticed, however,
that none of the Acts distinguish in terms between different kinds
of strikes.
The British Columbia legislation alone confers a civil cause of
action upon the employer struck in contravention of the Act. 33
All other substantive legislation dealing with civil causes of action
is exculpatory. Four provinces 34 provide that an act done by two
or more persons in furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be
actionable unless the act would be actionable if done without the
conspiracy . Of these, three provinces provide that a trade union
may not as such be a party to, nor may a collective agreement be
the subject of, an action unless they would so be held irrespective
of any provision of the Labour Relations Act .35 Newfoundland,
alone, appeared to bar actions for interference with trade or employment, or for procuring breach of contract, in furtherance of a
trade dispute although this exculpation proved ephemeral. 36 In
short, (except for British, Columbia) if civil liability is to be imposed for strikes in Canada, it must be at common law."
32 S.B .C., 1954, c. 17, s. 54(3) ; R.S.O., 1950, c. 194, s. 59 ; R.S.S., 1953,
c. 259, s. 5(d)(e) . In British Columbia, the judge making the declaration
has the power to cancel the collective agreement, checkoff, or certification
of the offending union . S.B.C., 1954, c. 17, s. 55 . In Saskatchewan, the
Labour Relations Board may determine that an unlawful strike exists, and
make appropriate orders which are to be enforced by the courts. R.S.S.,
1953, c. 259, ss. 10, 12.
33 Trade-unions Act, S.B.C., 1959, c. 90, s. 4. See Carrothers, (1960),
38 Can. Bar Rev. 295, for discussion of new British Columbia legislation .
34 Trade Union Act, R.S.N., 1952, c. 262, s. 4 ; Rights of Labour Act,
R.S.O., 1950, c. 341, s. 3(1) ; Trade Unions Act, R.S.S., 1953, c. 259, s. 22;
Trade-unions Act, S.B.C., ibid., s. 5.
3s R.S .N., ibid., s. 6 (no action in tort against union or members);
R.S.O., s. 3(2)(3) ; R.S.S., ibid., ss. 23, 24.
3s R.S .N ., ibid., s. 5. This provision was rendered nugatory by the
decision in Anglo-Newfoundland v. L W.A . (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 766
(Nfld.), which confined its protection to unions which had complied
with the filing requirements of the Act (of which, apparently, there had
been none since the passage of the Act). See editorial note, 17 D .L.R.
(2d) 766 . In fact, the section may have been repealed by a 1959 amendment to the Labour Relations Act, s. 52A(1) .
37 It is only the substantive issues which will be dealt with herein ; hence
no distinction will be drawn between suits against the union officers or
members (individually or in a representative capacity) and the union
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Strike .

Before proceeding to an examination of the techniques by which
the common law imposes liability for strikes, several definitional
matters require enunciation. All but two Acts define "strikes" . as
Two main legislative definitions appear, typified by Ontario
"strike" includes a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to continue to work by employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common understanding, or a slow-down or other
concerted activity on the part of employees designed to restrict or
limit output .3s

and British Columbia :

"strike" includes a cessation of work or refusal to continue to work
by employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a
common understanding for the purpose of compelling their employer
to agree to terms or conditions of employment or of compelling another
employer to agree to terms or conditions of employment of his employees. 40

Both statutes involve these elements : (i) a cessation of work (ii)
by employees and (iii) in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common understanding. In addition, the British
Columbia legislation contains a limitation (underlined) which
goes to the purpose at which the work-stoppage must be aimed
before it is to be a "strike" within the Act.
Caveats should be entered to each limb of the statutory definitions. There are work-stoppages which do not amount to a
strike, being de minimis," for which no civil relief would seem to
be available. On the second limb of the definitions, when the employment relation terminates, the strike ceases to exist.42 It is the
third limb, that of "combination or . . . common understanding",
which has given the courts the most trouble . Surprisingly, it has
itself. For an analysis of the Canadian law on this subject see Sherbaniuk,
Actions By and Against Trade Unions in Contract and Tort (1958), 12
U.T .L.J . 151 ; see also Therien v. Teamsters (1960), 22 D .L.R . (2d) 1
(S . C . C .).
33 Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan .
31 R .S .O., 1950, c. 194, s . 1(1)(h), and see also R .S .C ., 1952, c . 152,
s. 2(p) ; R.S .N .B ., 1952, c . 124, s . 1(p) ; R .S .N ., 1952, c. 258, s . 2(1)(p) ;
R .S.Q ., 1941, c. 162A, s . 2(f) .
40 S.B .C ., 1954, c. 17, s. 2(1) (emphasis added) ; and see also R .S .A .,
1955, c. 167, s . 55 (1)(i) ; R.S .M ., 1954, c. 132, s . 2(1)(p) ; R .S.N .S ., 1954,
c . 295, s . 1(q) .
41Belleville Lock Co . v . Tyner, [1950] O .W.N. 793 (H .C .) ; Borek v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters etc ., [1956] S .C . 333 (Que .), Patchett v . Pacific
Great Eastern Rwy. (1957), 23 W.W .R . (N .S .) 145 (B .C .C .A.), per Davey
J .A . (dissenting on other grounds) .
4a Belleville Lock Co . v . Tyner, ibid. ; Seaboard Owners v. Cross, [1949]
3 D .L .R . 709 (B .C.) . See also Re Canadian Gypsum and Nova Scotia
Quarry-workers etc . Union (1959), 20 D .L.R . (2d) 319.
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been held that the refusal of a single workman to work is a "strike",
although this is difficult to square with the legislation .43 More
important are the cases dealing with a cessation of work by employees who may not be acting "in accordance with a common
understanding" . The question arises when a picketline is respected by employees who have no primary dispute with the picketed
employer . In Smith Bros . Construction v. Jones No. 2 44 McLennan
J. held, in such a situation that the refusal of employees to cross
a picket-line was not a "simultaneous cessation of work" and
therefore not a strike . However, he noted that :

If the development of the Trade Union movement has reached the
point where workers will not cross a picket4ine to go to work, that is
just as effective an interference with contractual relations as any other
form of restraint might be. Loyalty to the rule that I have mentioned
having been developed, the rule should not be abused for a wrongful
purpose and where there is no justification . 43

He went on to hold the picketing union liable for unjustified interference with contractual relations. Several cases, however, have
held that the refusal by employees to cross a picket-line would
visit additional liability upon the picketers for procuring an illegal
strike. 46 Implicit in this reasoning is a readiness to find the "strikers" liable for their unlawfulness . Except for one case, 47 however,
the work stoppages were not "for the purpose of compelling (an)
employer to agree to terms and conditions of employment", but
rather involved recognition and jurisdictional disputes . The
argument appears not to have been made, but it is conceivable
that a work stoppage for this purpose falls outside the statutory
ban .48 Furthermore, the element of "common understanding"
of the employees inter se appears to be lacking, except insofar as
43 Swansea Construction Co . v . Royal Trust Co . (1956), 5 D .L .R . (2d)
687 (Ont . C .A .) ; but see contra Thomas Fuller Construction Co. v. Rochon
(1957), 10 D .L.R . (2d) 670 (Ont.) . For American authorities to this effect,
see 83 Corpus Juris Secundum pp. 543-4. McAllister, Case and Comment,
(1956), 34 Can . Bar Rev . 587, at p . 589, suggests that the Swansea judgment
accords with the view that "the strength of numbers as against one cannot
be made a decisive basis of the law".
44
[195514 D .L .R . 255 (Ont .) .
45 Ibid., at p . 264 .
46
Pacific Western Planing Mills v . International Woodworkers etc.,
[1955] 1 D .L.R . 652 (B .C.) ; Bevaart v . Flecher (1956), 2 D .L.R. (2d) 77
(B .C .) ; Dawson, Wade v . Tunnel etc. Union of Canada (1956), 5 D .L .R.
(2d) 663, 715 (B.C .) ; Bennett & White v . Van Reeder (1956), 6 D .L.R .
(2d) 356 (Alta . C .A .) ; Merloni v. Acme Construction, i[1959] C.C.H. Lab .
L .R., para. 15, 226 (N.B .) .
47
Pacific Western Planing Mills v . International Woodworkers etc., ib1d.,
where no work stoppage did take place, but the terms and conditions of
employment at the picketed plant were in issue .
48 For an early attempt at
a common-law definition in purposive terms,
see Reid, What Is a "Strike"? (1912), 32 Can . L.T . 685 .
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they all profess loyalty to the same principle of union solidarity.
In fact, as several judges have pointed out, the refusal to cross the
picket-line may rather be motivated by a fear of being blacklisted
by the union and hence deprived of job opportunities."
It should be noted, also, that to make actionable threats to
strike or procuring a strike necessarily implies that the strike
threatened or procured would itself be actionable. To threaten to
do or to procure someone to do a lawful act is not actionable."
Imprecision in definition of a "strike", of course, should be
kept in mind when considering theories of liability.
V. Breach of the Labour Relations Act as a Cause of Action .

A trio of British Columbia cases have developed the doctrine that
breach of the Labour Relations Act is per se a cause of action .
The idea seems to have been cut from whole cloth in Vancouver
Machinery Depot v. United Steel Workers." The union in that
case struck in support of wage demands in advance of the strike
vote required by section 31A of the Industrial Conciliation and
Arbitration Act, 52 then in force. The company sought to enjoin
unlawful striking. The union defended on the grounds (i) that it
was not a suable entity, and (ii) that the plaintiff's writ disclosed
no cause of action . After holding, on the basis of the Patterson
case" that unions certified under the collective bargaining legislation are juristic persons, Macfarlane J. turned to the substantive question :
While the Act here may have a public purpose as its end, the means by
which it is sought to accomplish that end is by granting and imposing
correlative rights and duties as between these parties and declaring
any breach of the obligations so created as unlawful in certain circumstances . 5'
11 Mostrenko v. Groves, [1953] 3 D .L.R . 400 (D .C .) ; Dawson, Wade v .
Tunnel etc. Union of Canada, supra, footnote 46 .
11 Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A .C . 700, at p . 730 ; Crofter v. Veitch, [1942]
A .C . 453, at p . 467 ; Brown v . Spamberger (1959), 21 D .L.R . (2d) 630
(Ont. C .A .) . But see contra Note, Economically Motivated Interference
with At Will Contract Held Actionable (1957), 57 Col . L . Rev . 1188 .
11 [1948] 1 D .L .R. 114 (B . C .), aff'd . [1948] 4 D .L.R . 518 (B . C . C. A .),
leave to appeal to S .C .C . denied, [194814 D .L .R. 522.
sz S .B .C., 1947, c . 44 .
sa R e Patterson and Nanaimo Dry Cleaning and Laundry Workers Union,
Loc. No . 1, [1947] 4 D .L.R . 159 (B .C.), aff'd . [1947] 4 D .L.R . 166
(B .C .C .A.) . The decision by Macfarlane J ., however, dealt with prosecution and fines under the Act for illegal strikes : "The question I have to
decide is as to the effect of this particular statute conferring these particular
powers and imposing particular restrictions and liabilities on the trade
union bringing itself under it . . . . . . Ibid., at p . 164. On appeal, O'Halloran
J .A. relied on the imposition of fines for "specified statutory breaches"
at p . 173 (B .C.C.A .) .
54 [194811 D.L .R. 114, at p . 127.
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It thus follows that

Declaring an act unlawful as between the parties means that if one
person does such an act and causes harm to another, the person doing the act runs the risk of certain reactions detrimental to him. The
essence of this risk is liability to pay damages as compensation for
the harm done ."

In so holding, the learned judge rejected the argument of defendants that the Act, being designed to secure industrial peace and to
protect the public, did not make illegal what was formerly legal
- economic strikes. Peace, the judge noted, is to be secured both
by prohibitions of some acts (strikes) and encouragement of
others (collective bargaining). As will be suggested below, however, it is self-contradictory to forbid strikes while encouraging
collective bargaining . The former is the price of the latter .
Moreover, his judgment is based primarily upon two predicates : an acceptance of a line of authority imposing liability
for breach of a statutory duty, and rejection of the authorities
which hold the injunction an improper remedy for acts penalized
by statute . As to the second, the judge's stated refusal to follow
Dallas v. Felek 11 (and his failure to refer to Robinson v. Adams")
is apparently even repudiated by him when in an aside,"' he declined to grant the injunction to which he had already held the
plaintiffs entitled because of an "unseemly conflict" with concurrent quasi-criminal proceedings in another court.
On the dominant theme of liability for breach of the Labour
Relations Act, O'Halloran J.A ., in the Court of Appeal agreed
that a union could be made liable in damages "for the purpose of
implementing that Act and for causes of action that may possibly
be founded directly upon its provisions or a breach thereof" :"s
It is submitted that these judgments confuse the procedural decision in the Patterson case-holding the union as an entity subject to the statutory penalties expressly provided-with the substantive issue of finding a cause of action secreted in the Act itself. Only Macfarlane J. deals with this problem, and his failure
to advert to the leading Canadian authorities in the closely anal11 Ibid., at p . 134 .
51 [19341 O .W.N. 247 (C .A .) .
sr (1924), 56 O .L .R . 217 (C .A.) . "The equitable jurisdiction of a civil
court cannot properly be invoked to supress crime . . . . Much less should
the courts interfere when the thing complained of is not within the terms
of the criminal law, although it may be rightly regarded as objectionable
or even immoral, for then the civil courts by injunction are attempting to
enlarge and amend the criminal law. Government by injunction is a thing
abhorrent to the law of England and of this province." at ,p . 224, per
Middeleton J .A.
58 Supra, footnote 54, at p . 133 .
59
[19481 4 D.L.R . 518, at p . 521, and see Sloan, C .J.B .C ., at p . 524 .
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ogous field of combines makes his judgment less than adequate .
In the Pacific Western Planing Mills case," an injunction was
granted against inducing an illegal strike in plaintiff's business
operation. Upon breakdown of industry-wide contract negotiations, a strike vote was held in which plaintiff's employees alone
voted against a strike . Plaintiff's plant was picketed by defendants
(employees of the other plants) who carried "on strike" signs.
The picketing was held tortious because:
[The Act] provides in effect that no employees shall strike until a vote
of the employees in the unit affected . . . in favour of a strike . Here
as stated the vote of the plaintiff's employees was against a strike . . . .
clearly it would seem as matters now stand a strike on their part
would be unlawful, and so is the attempt by the defendants to persuade
or induce them to commit this unlawful act unlawful . °1

It thus appears that absent the requisite procedural steps, not
only are strikes in breach of the statute unlawful, but so also is
picketing to persuade non-strikers to come out, though why there
should be a presumption that they will strike illegally is by no
means clear. The decision in this case is the more peculiar because
of the judge's failure to appreciate that this was an industry-wide
strike following industry-wide bargaining and an industry-wide
strike vote . In fragmenting the strike vote result, he deprived the
union of the broad strike sanction which it needed to back up its
broad demandS. 62
If strikes are unlawful and provisions analogous to section
33 63 are read as conferring a cause of action against the strikers
as in the Vancouver Machinery case, a similar liability is apparently
to be imposed upon those who "declare or authorize" such
strikes. A strict reading of the case, then, would leave equally
vulnerable those who advise a strike which might or might not
turn out to be contrary to the Act," and those who do in fact
breach the Act. The defendant picketers are thus deprived of the
°°sl Supra,

footnote 46.
at p . 655 .
Carrothers, A Study In the Law of Picketing (1955), 2 U.B .C. Leg .
Not . 187, at p. 238, suggests that the case can only be supported on the
"thin strand" of false information conveyed by the picketers .
"Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, R.S .B .C., 1948, c. 155,
s . 33 : "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, no person shall
declare or authorize a strike and no employee shall strike until after a vote
of the employees in the unit affected as to whether to strike or not to
strike has been taken and the majority of such employees who vote have
voted in favour of a strike ."
64 Cf. "A person who advocates the object without advocating the
means is (not) to be taken to have advocated recourse to unlawful means ."
Thomson v. Deakin, [1952] Ch . 646, at pp . 697-8 (C .A.), per Jenkins L .J.
°2

Ibid.,
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defence of mens rea available to them in the penal proceedings
upon which this action is supposedly based."
In the case of Therien v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters," the plaintiff alleged interference with his livelihood. The
defendant union insisted upon his membership although, as an
owner-operator and an employer, he was not legally able to join.
Upon his refusal of membership, the union procured his dismissal
from a trucking job. In dismissing a motion to strike out the
plaintiff's writ because a union is not suable entity, Wilson J.
found that "the plaintiff sets up breaches by the defendant of the
Labour Relations Act which can give him a cause of action" ."
The breach relied on was an unfair practice under the Labour
Relations Act."
At trial, Clyne J. more clearly enunciated the doctrine

As I have already said, I think the plaintiff has at common law a cause
of action . . . . But I also think that the violation of see. 6 of the statute
itself creates a liability on the part of the defendant ."

After calling in aid authority, the judge continued :

While it may be said that the object of the Act was the preservation
of industrial peace for the public benefit, the reading of the Act as a
whole indicates an intention of the Legislature to create rights for the
benefit of individuals . . . . I have no doubt that under the Act an
employee would have a right of action against an employer if he were
dismissed because he was a member of a trade union. By the same
token, I think a person whose right of refraining from joining a union
is infringed by coercion and who suffers damage thereby, has a cause
of. action . . . . In my view the plaintiff has a cause of action against
the defendant both under the statute and at common law.',s

Damages were awarded for "loss of a valuable business connection"
as well as for the loss suffered as a result of his discharge on this
particular job.
In the Court of Appeal, DesBrisay C.J.B.C . alone appears to
have relied heavily upon the breaches of the Act as giving a cause
ss American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts, s. 286, comment c.
(The topic is only dealt with in the context of negligence) . However, the
English cases hold defence to the penal action irrelevant . Salmond, Torts
(11th ed., 1953), p. 611, note (s) .
es (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 746 (motion to strike out writ), (1957), 13
D.L.R. (2d) 347, aff'd . (1958), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 346 (B.C.C .A.), aff'd .
(1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C .).
sr Ibid., (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 746, at p. 749 .
ss S .B.C., 1954, c. 17, s. 6 : "No trade-union, employers' organization,
or person shall use coercion or intimidation of any kind that could reasonably have the effect of compelling or inducing any person to become or
refrain from becoming, or to continue or to cease to be, a member of a
trade-union ."
"(1957), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 347, at p. 359 .
70 Ibid., at pp. 360-1 .
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of action." Sheppard J.A ., although also affirming the decision
below, differed on this point :
In relying upon sees . 4 and 6 of the statute the Plaintiff is not to be
taken as asserting a statutory cause of action. The plaintiff is here
founding upon a common-law cause of action . . . . 11

Davey J.A . refrained from deciding the point." In the Supreme
Court of Canada, Locke J. alone adverted to this basis of liability,
and adopted the reasoning of Sheppard J.A., below." The reasoning in the Supreme Court of Canada may well obviate future resort to the doctrine that breach of the Labour Relations Act per
se confers a civil cause of action .
At any rate, the authorities and dicta 75 which had so held must
now be read subject to Locke J.'s holding that liability is founded
upon "not a statutory cause of action, but a common-law cause
of action" .71
The general proposition of law that a civil action will lie for
breach of a statute which carries penal sanctions, has had a
chequered career in Canada . The problem is a thorny one at best,
but the Canadian decisions reflect the additional factor of a distribution of legislative powers which gives the provinces exclusive
control in relation to property and civil rights within the province,
while reserving criminal law to federal jurisdiction . 77
1 (1958), 16 D .L.R . (2d) 646, at p . 655 .
72 Ibid., at p . 680.
71 Ibid., at p . 666 .
7A (1960), 22 D .L.R . (2d) 1, at p . 13 .
75 Injunctions for breach of the Act, see e .g. : Aird & Son Ltd. v . Loc.
500, Int'l. Union of Shoe and Leather Workers et al, [1948] 3 D .L .R . 114
(Que .) ; Smith Bros. Construction Co . Ltd. v. Jones No . 1 & 2, [1954] 2
D.L .R . 117 (motion for interlocutory injunction), [1955] 4 D .L .R. 255
(Ont .) ; Oakville Wood Specialties Ltd. v. Mustin, [1950] O .W.N. 735 ;
Har-A-Mac Const . Co . Ltd . v . Harkness, [1958] O .W .N . 366 ; Dawson,
Wade Co . v . Tunnel etc . Union of Canada, supra, footnote 46 ; Gagnon v.
Foundation Maritime, [1958] C.C.H. Lab. L.R ., para. 15,213 (N.B .C.A .) ;
Dominion Bridge v . Int'l . Bridge etc. Ironworkers (1959), 20 D .L.R . (2d)
621 (B .C .C .A .) (quashing contempt conviction for violation of injunction
against striking) . Damages for breach of the Act ; see e.g . . Acme Construction v . Merloni, supra, footnote 46 ; Vails Star Laundry v. Monckton
Laundry etc. Union: (1956), 40 M .P.R . 169 (N .B .) (strike held legal on
facts) ; Smith Bros. Construction v. Jones No . 2, supra, footnote 44 ; Dewar
v . Dwan (1957), 11 D .L.R . (2d) 130 (Ont .) ; Hallnor Mines Ltd. v. Behie,
[195411 D .L .R . 135 (Ont .) ; Re Paterson and Nanaimo etc. Union, Loc . No.
1, [1947] 4 D .L .R . 159 (B .C .C .A .) . But see contra : Southam v. Gouthro,
[194813 D .L.R . 178 (B .C .) ; General Dry Batteries Ltd. v . Brigenshaw et al,
[195114 D .L .R . 414 (Ont.) ; Peerless Laundry & Cleaners Ltd. v. Laundry
etc . Workers' Union, [1952] 4 D .L .R . 475 (Man .) .
76 Supra, footnote 74 .
77 F or a discussion of the existence of a civil cause of action for breach
of the federal combines legislation, see Transport Oil Ltd. v, Imperial Oil
Ltd., [1935] O .R. 111, [1935] 1 D .L.R . 751, aff'd . [1935] O .R. 215, [1935]
2 D .L.R . 500 (C .A .) . It is on the constitutional ground that the Transport
Oil decision was followed in Gordon v. Imperial Tobacco Sales Co., [1939]

1960]

Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada

35 9

Constitutional questions aside, the cases focus on legislative
intent . The reluctance, indeed refusal, of the Canadian courts to
look to legislative history," . combined with the unavailability of
this material, 79 of necessity makes this an exercise of imagination
rather than investigation.
The question of intent has been phrased in its commonly accepted form by Duff J. (as he then was) in Orpen v. Roberts:
But the object and provisions of the statute as a whole must be examined with a view to determining whether it is part of the scheme
of the legislation to create, for the benefit of indivuduals, rights enforceable by action ; or whether the remedies provided by the statute
are intended to be the sole remedies available by way of guarantees.
to the public for the observance of the statutory duty, or by way of
compensation to individuals who have suffered by reason of the non-performance of that duty. 10

This type of speculation has been termed a "dangerous business", both in the United States" and Canada ." As one authorcommented :
When a statute explicity creates a, criminal liability, the court which
reads a civil obligation into the enactment is embarking upon a perilous speculation. This does not exceed its power, but it does overstep
the decent amenities of judicial conduct . . , . A right is simply the :
ex post facto aspect of a remedy, and it savors of absurdity to impute.
2 D .L .R. 27 (Ont .) . See Finkelman, Case and Comment, (1935), 13 Can .
Bar Rev . 517 to the same effect . And see Philco Products v . Thermionics,
[1940] S.C .R . 501 . "If B commits an indictable offence and the direct consequence . . . is that A suffers some special harm different from that of
the rest of His Majesty's subjects, then, speaking generally, A has a right
of action against B . . . this well-settled doctrine does . . . apply to indictable
offences under section 498 of the Criminal Code . . . . " Ibid., at p . 504, per
Duff C.J .C . See Case and Comment, (1941), 19 Car. . Bar Rev . 51, attacking
the inquiry into legislative purpose . For discussion of an analogous situation in the United States, concerning the effect of the federal labour legislation on state common law relief, see 32 A.L.R . 2d . 829, 1026 (Anno .)
and cases and articles cited therein . State jurisdiction is preserved where
the conduct is neither prohibited nor protected by the federal legislation ..
See also Cox, The Right to Engage In Concerted Activities (1951), 26,
Ind . L .J . 319, at p. 334 .
7$ Kilgour, The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History (1952,.
30 Can . Bar Rev . 769 ; Davis, Legislative History and the Wheat Board
Case (1953), 31 Can . Bar Rev . 1 ; Milner, Correspondence, (The Use of
Legislative History) (1953), 31 Can . Bar Rev . 228 .
7s The evidence
of the hearings preceding the first "effective" labour
Act, that of Ontario, is available in shorthand in the legislative library .
Laskin, Collective Bargaining in Ontario : A New Legislative Approach.
(1943), 21 Can . Bar Rev. 684, footnote 6 .
$° [1925] S .C .R . 364, at p. 370 .
81 Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1913),
27 Harv . L . Rev. .
317, at p . 320.
11 "That a penal statute never intended-and
in a country like Canada, .
may be constitutionally unable-to confer a civil cause of action is nowapparent to almost every one except the courts." Wright, The English Law,
of Torts (1955), 11 U .T.L .J . 84, at pp. 94-5 .
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to the legislature an intention to create a civil liability, where it has
manifested no intention of creating a civil remedy."

The dangers inherent in this inquiry are, perhaps, best demonstrated by the contradictory analyses of Wilson J. in the Southam
and Therien cases. In the former case, he was prepared to find that
-like the English Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act
(1875),$4 and the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927), 3°
where there was no federal problem-P.C. 1003 did not in and
of itself create a civil cause of action . In the latter case, dealing
with essentially identical legislation, he was prepared to concede
that it did .
Midway between the two readings of the statute is the analogy
to the law of public nuisance drawn by Thayer
As society develops, new dangers to the public welfare are constantly
perceived, and new prohibitions are enacted by the legislature . . . .
Whatever form the prohibition may take, and the varieties are infinite,
a danger has been deemed by the legislature so great as to justify
making its creation or continuance a public wrong. A new statutory
"nuisance" has thus been created in every sense in which that word
has legal significance ; and . . . an action lies in favour of one who has
suffered a private injury from a public nuisance .$s

In the field of strikes and trade combinations, he suggests, "The
rules of the fight have been changed by the final authority, and
the field ofcompetition has been cut down accordingly" . 37 Thayer's
plea is for "self-restraint and breadth of view" on the part of the
judges, and a deference to legislative determination of social
values . It is hard to take issue with this approach, except that it
may reach indirectly the result that it hesitates to reach directly.
The imposition of civil liability for strikes is more than the redress of a private injury ; it involves a substantial policing of
labour relations. This may not be entirely improper in the area of
injunctive relief to prevent irreparable injury ." However, it is
sa Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation (1931),
16 Minn. L . Rev . 361, at pp . 363-4.
81 38 & 39 Vict ., c . 86.
11 17 & 18 Geo . V, c . 22, repealed (1946), 9 & 10 Geo . VI, c . 52.
e' Ibid., at p . 343 .
se Supra, footnote 81, at pp . 327-8 .
8 8 "It would be preposterous . . . that there was an unlawful strike in
existence, and notwithstanding that irreparable injury was being suffered
by the plaintiff as a result of that strike, no remedy would be available to
the applicant because that remedy might have the appearance of interfering
with a strike or with the relations between employer and employees",
per Gale J . in Oakville Wood Specialties Ltd. v. Mustin, supra, footnote
75, at p . 737. It is interesting to speculate as to whom the irreparable
harm is done by this injunction application, when the learned judge's
comment that . "It is conceivable, although, I hope, hardly likely, that the
action will eventually come to trial", ibid., at p . 735, is contrasted with his
later repudiation of the interim injunction as a strikebreaking weapon in
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submitted that to award damages for breach of a statute is to accept legislative judgment on the nature of the wrong, while ignoring it on the price to be paid by someone in breach .
Even this, however, is to be preferred to the conjectural and
unseemly inquiry into the "scheme of the legislation" pursued by
the English and Canadian courts ."
At best, one might hope for legislation in this area, either explicitly rejecting a cause of action in these cases, or explicitly
conferring it in the case of strikes for purposes beyond the legitimate range of union activities . 99 In the United States, this view
has been embodied in section 303(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act
which provides :

Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
[practices enumerated in s. 303(a)] may sue therefore . . . and shall recover damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit."

The advantage of this type of legislation is that it enables the
court to remain within "the decent amenities of judicial conduct"
while redressing injuries not considered the legitimate hurt of
economic strife . It should be noted, also, that liability is imposed
because of the object of the strike, rather than the formality 92 with
which it is carried out.

v. Nicols, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 75 (Ont .) ; quaere,
also, as to the "irreparable" nature of the harm done.
19 The test in Orpen v.
Roberts, supra, footnote 80, seems not to have
been rejected in any Canadian case. For a recent leading English case,
see Cutler v. Wansworth Stadium, [1949] A.C. 398 (H.L.). Salmond on
Torts, op. cit ., supra, footnote 65, at p. 604, suggests that breach of a
statutory duty may give.a prima facie right of action, depending on legislative intention. Street, Torts (1955), p. 284, recounts the history of an
action upon a statute, but candidly admits, "Many of the decided cases
can, for the most part, be regarded as judicial decisions of policy whether
breaches of certain provisions should be compensated for in damages" .
For a discussion ofthe relevant factors, see at p. 289 et seqq. The American
position appears to have developed a sophisticated test of legislative intent ;
American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts, ss. 286-8 ; Prosser on Torts
(2d. ed., 1955), p. 154 et seqq . and p. 344 et seqq . The discussion in the
Restatement should be read in the light of ss. 814 and 949 dealing with
labour injunctions, to appreciate the full range of the data thought relevant. See also Fleming, on Torts (1957), p. 140 et seqq. for an Australian
attack on "the will o' the wisp of a non-existent legislative intention",
and Martin v . Western etc. Union (1934), 34 S.R. (N.S.W.) 593, for a
review of the relevant considerations, and the refusal of damage relief in
the face of penal sanctions by administrative process .
"British Columbia has recently introduced legislation imposing civil
liability for all breaches of the Act, without distinction as to gravity or
purpose . See, Trade-unions Act, supra, footnote 33.
11 61 Stat. (pt . 1) 136, at p. 158 ; (1947), 29 U.S.C.A., s. 187. S. 303 (a)'
renders unlawful (for purposes only of the damage action) certain forms
of secondary
pressure, recognition and jurisdictional strikes .
92
Jamieson, Industrial Relations and Government Policy (1951), 17
C.J.E.P .S. 25, at pp. 28-9 ; cf. Golof v. I.W.A., [1959] C.C.H. Lab. L.R.
para. 15, 236 (B.C., Cy. Ct .).
Halliday Contracting Co .
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Of course, where the legislature has established a statutory
scheme conferring rights and obligations unenforced by either
penal sanctions or private remedies, a creative court will fill the
vacuum. In the United States, decisions under the Railway Labour
Act 93 have sensibly reached this position ." The whole rationale
of the American decisions disappears, however, in the face of
penal provisions in the Canadain labour' statutes, and ample
heads of common-law recovery for conspiracy and inducing
breach . If legislation is not forthcoming specifically to confer
causes of action, then the illegally struck employer has remedies
short of conjectural resort to legislative intent .
Finally, as the Vancouver Machinery 96 case itself showed, there
is considerable confusion between the substantive basis of liability
and the procedural problem of the suability of a union . In holding, in the Therien case, that a union certified under the Labour
Relations Act is suable both in contract and tort, the Supreme
Court of Canada avoided the anomaly created by the decisions"
of the British Columbia courts : that a union is suable in tort if
the action is couched in terms of a breach of the Labour Relations
Act, but not if framed in traditional common-law terminology,
although the acts complained of be identical
VI. Civil Conspiracy .
The modern tort of conspiracy stands condemned, almost universally, as the vehicle ofjudicial anti-unionism. 97 Authors throughout the common-law world have denounced it as a "weapon . . .
wielded with transparent partisanship to counter the aspirations
of the trade union movement"."
The constituent elements of the tort, at least in the strike con-

48 Stat . 1185, 45 U .S .C., s . 151 et seqq.
Texas N.O .R . v . Bro . Railtivay etc. Clerks (1930), 281 U .S . 548 ;
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry . Co . (1944), 323 U.S . 192 .
9 5 Supra, footnote 51 .
96 Vancouver Machinery Depot v. United Steel Workers, supra, footnote
51 ; Pacific Western Planing Mills, supra, footnote 60 ; Therien v . Teamsters,
supra, footnote 66 .
97 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940), ss . 13-24 ;
Prosser, op . cit., supra, footnote 89, p. 755 et seqq ., Fleming, op. cit ., supra,
footnote 89, pp . 725-6 ; Warm, Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions
and Labour Legislation (1938), 23 Minn . L. Rev . 255, at p . 318 et seqq.,
B.L ., Case and Comment, (1942), 20 Can . Bar, Rev . 636 ; Friedmann, The
Harris Tweed Case and Freedom of Trade (1942), 6 Mod . L . Rev. 1, at
pp . _5-7 ; Social Security and Some Recent Developments in the Common
Law (1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev . 369, at p. 379 ; Cox, op . cit., supra, footnote
77, at p . 323 ; American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts, s . 38, at pp .
95-6 ; cf. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1921), 35 Harv. L. Rev . 393, at
p . 427, calls the doctrine the "evil genius of our law" .
as Fleming, op . cit ., supra, footnote 89, p . 725 .
93

94
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text, are (i) concerted activity (ii) to achieve an objective considered illegitimate or (iii) to achieve a legitimate objective by means
which are either per se actionable or otherwise unlawful. Put
negatively, to avoid civil liability, a strike must impinge upon
neither social sensibilities of judges nor legal "rights" . The attack
on the tort has been mounted on three levels, paralleling the elements of the tort. First, is there in concerted activity anything so
analytically distinctive as to merit judicial concern? Second, do
judges (consciously or otherwise) in assessing objectives arrogate
legislative value judgments to themselves ; and, if so, are these
judgments proper? Third, what factors invoke group liability
where the individual may act with impunity?
The three-pronged attack on the conspiracy doctrine as an
anti-strike weapon has been successful on the first two levels . As
to the distinctiveness of concerted activity, the most recent Eng
lish case in this field, the Crofter case," effectively makes the
point that conspiracy is an anomolous remedy and reflects its
Star Chamber criminal antecedents ."' The anomoly lies in the
crudeness"' of drawing a line between one individual and two :
"Some men are a host in their individual selves . . . some multitudes
are asses". 102
At the second level, that of valuejudgments, for a time at
least it seemed that English, 101 American,104 Canadian,101 and
° 9 Supra, footnote 50; to the same effect, see Fraser v . McKernan (1931),
46 C.L.R.
at p. 410, per Evatt J.
101 Ibid.,343,
at pp. 443-4, per Lord Simon, at p. 468, per Lord Wright ; cf.
Hughes; The Tort of Conspiracy (1952), 15 Mod. L. Rev. 209, at p. 213
Conspiracy has been called a "tort of meglomaniac pretentions" (at p. 214).
"I Fleming,
op . cit., supra, footnote 89, p. 724 .
102
Sorrell v. Smith, supra, footnote 50, at p. 722 per Lord Dunedin
(quoting counsel in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495, at p. 504). "In
the play, Cyrano de Bergerac's single voice was more effective to drive the
bad actor Montfleury off the stage than the protests of all the rest of the
audience to restrain him. The action of a single tyrant may be more potent
to inflict suffering on the continent of Europe than a combination of less
powerful persons." Crofter v . Veitch, supra, footnote 50, at p . 443, per
V. Simon L.C.
ma Crofter v . Veitch, ibid., at p. 472, per Lord Wright : "English law . . .
has for better or worse adopted the test of self-interest or selfishness as
being capable ofjustifying the deliberate doing of lawful acts which inflict
harm, so long as the means employed are not wrongful . . . . If further
principles of regulation or control are to be introduced, that is a matter
for the legislature."
1°4 U.S. v . Hutcheson (1940), 312 U.S.
219, at p. 232, per Frankfurter
J. : "So long as a union acts in its self-interest . . . the licit and the illicit
. . . are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or
unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of
the end of which the particular union activities are the means," (in the
context
of entitlement to protection under Clayton Act, s. 20) .
101
Corbett v. Canadian National Printing Trades, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 441
(Alta. C.A.).
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Australian"' courts were finally committing themselves to a policy
of judicial restraint . Indeed, as one author has suggested, the
Wagner Act itself (and presumably Canadian legislation patterned after it) was committed to a policy of non-intervention in the
bargaining process, beyond guaranteeing its necessary preconditions ."' The trend of the law was thus to leave labour free to
choose its own legitimate objectives without judicial evaluation
under the "lawful objectives" branch of conspiracy. In Canada,
at least, this tendency was shortlived . In Corbett v. Canadian

National Printing Trades,"' the majority did follow the selfinterest test of the Crofter case, although Ford J.A . (dissenting)

spoke of the "unlawful and unjustifiable" acts of the union."'
In Southana v. Gouthro, 111 Wilson J ., although finding liability for
conspiracy on other grounds, likewise hewed to the Crofter test
of self-interest
Their object was at worst, the furtherance of their own interest (an
object which the law accepts as legitimate) and at best an altruistic
interest in the welfare of their Winnipeg brothers . No law has yet
proclaimed altruism, however misguided, to be an illegal object ."'
The same judge in William' v. Aristocratic Restaurant 112 again
adopted Lord Wright's self-interest test in the Crofter case .
The trend of course, despite the optimistic predictions of commentators, 113 was far from universal. For example, Manson J . in
Seaboard Owners v. Cross 114 in 1949 delivered an intemperate discourse on labour relations :

Lock-outs and strikes are both forms of warfare and neither are
compatible with the good old British way of taking disputes to the
Courts, which, unfortunately, in the case of certain disputes as between employer and employee, as the law stands, cannot be done . . . .
[The picketing] was calculated and intended to compel another person to do that which he had a right to abstain from doing . . . ,n5
The same year, Fokuhl v. Raymond"' saw the Ontario courts
giving voice to a moral indignation which, no matter how justified,
is a far cry from judicial restraint . Relying on Quinn v. Leathem 117
Fraser v . McKernan, supra, footnote 99 .
Cox & Dunlop, The Regulation of Collective Bargaining (1950), 63
Harv. L . Rev . 389.
104 Supra, footnote 105 .
109 Ibid., at p . 453 .
11e [194813 D.L .R. 178 (B.C .) .
M Ibid., at p . 184 .
112 (195014 D .L.R . 548, at pp . 551-2 (B .C .) .
n8 ". . . the Crofter case is a landmark in the English law of civil conspiracy and an effective herald of a saner judicial attitude to trade union
functions under the common law . As such it stands as an example to
Canadian courts ." B.L., Case and Comment, supra, footnote 97, at p . 640 .
115Ibid., at p. 715 .
114 [19491 3 D .L.R . 709 (B.C.) .
110 [194914 D .L .R . 145 (Ont . C .A .).
117 [1901] A .C . 495 .
105

107
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and. Klein v. Jenoves"$ to find an interference with contractual
relations, Roach J.A. went on to say:
Every person is entitled to enter into whatever lawful contracts he
may choose to make . . . . The free and full exercise of that right is not
subject to the dictation or control of any other unauthorized person .
Raymond invaded the harmonious trade relations existing between
the respondent and his employees . . . with a high-handed, dictatorial
assumption of power . . . which ought to have been repelled by them
with such force and vigour as to make it certain once and for all
time that they were not slaves . . . . us

McRuer C.J.H .C . has delivered many important decisions in
labour law in Ontario. He has spoken in a compassionate way of,
. . . all the lawful rights to strike and the lawful rights to picket ; . . .

a freedom that should be preserved and its preservation has advanced
the interests of the labouring man and the community as a whole
to an untold degree over the last half-century ."

Yet, for him, the "broader and more important question" to be
considered was "the line between lawful strikes and picketing and
conspiracy to injure in order to obtain benefits for a particular
person or class" ."' He resolved the question before him (the
legality of picketing in support of a premature economic strike)
by forbidding employees to "bring external pressure to bear on
others who are doing business with a particular person for the
purpose of injuring the business of their employer so that he may
capitulate" ."'
With respect, the dichotomy created between "lawful strikes"
and "conspiracy to injure", and talk of "the purpose of injuring
the business of their employer" invites the judicial evaluation of
labour objectives which may subvert the "freedom" the learned
Chief Justice so prizes . This "vocabulary of vituperation""' enshrined in the conspiracy formulation is exactly what the Crofter
case was thought to have discarded .124
In Hammer v. Kemmis 125 for example, damages for conspiracy
"1
Supra, footnote 12.
Supra, footnote 116, at p . 159.
General Dry Batteries v. Brigenshaw, supra, footnote 75, at p . 419 .
121 Wilson Court Apts. v . Jenovese, [1958] O .W.N . 302,
at p . 303 .
122 General Dry Batteries v . Brigenshaw, supra, footnote
75, at p . 419 .
123 Pratt v. B .M.A ., [1919] 1, K.B . 244, per McCardie J.
124 "We hope that in the interest of the national drive for salvage, the
famous trilogy of cases, Mogul S.S. Co. v . McGregor, Gow & Co . . ., Allen
v . Flood . . . . and Quinn v. Leathem . . ., together with Sorrell v. Smith . . . ,
will now be consigned to the scrap heap." Note, (1942), 58 L.Q . Rev . 150.
The Crofter case was said to "represent a functional approach to trade
unionism, . . . and thus atones, after forty years, for Quinn v. Leathem".
B .L., Case and Comment, supra, footnote 97, at p. 636 .
125 (1956), 3 D .L.R .
(2d) 565, (1956),118 W.W .R . (N.S .) 673 (B .C .), aff'd .
(1956), 7 D .L.R . (2d) 684, (1956), 20 W .W.R . (N.S .) 619 (B.C .C .A.).
n3
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to injure by unlawful means (including nuisance and intimidation)
were awarded to a marginal bakery operator, the victim of organizational picketing. The purpose of the picketing was held by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal to be punitive . The basis
upon which the purpose was evaluated by Sheppard J.A . was an
excerpt from the trial testimony :
Q. Well, why so busy with something that does not concern you then?
You had no members in there and you had no complaints or requests
for assistance?
A . Well, I think, your Honour, that our job is to organize all the
bakeries in the City . . . . 1 s

The unsympathetic attitude there revealed is to be contrasted
with that of Davey J .A ., dissenting :
I should think wages below Union standards, even in one shop, would
be a matter of proper concern to the Union as a potential threat to
the standards it seeks to maintain . 12'
and :
. . . Hammer had thrown down the gage of battle ; consequently . . .
it would be useless to attempt to organize the shop by silent penetration or to secure a collective agreement by negotiation . . . those objects could only be secured by economic pressure . Economic pressure
exerted by persons acting in concert is not unlawful per se .1 11
One cannot but sympathize with Hammer's plight, yet the dissenting judgment surely reveals a deeper understanding of the
social realities, and brings to the fore the real clash of values
which inheres in judicial evaluation of "purpose" .
The debate continues between those judges who are content
to allow the clash of interests to be self-regulating, and those
whose convictions about a "right" to trade or work impel them
to label objectives as lawful or unlawful, and so to colour conspiracy . It is submitted that the former position is more consistent
with collective bargaining legislation . In the absence of legislative
pronouncement on the legitimacy of labour demands, moreover,
judicial standards do presume to evaluate what public policy has
not . This evaluation inflames the very antagonisms it seeks to
dampen, unless undertaken with restraint .
Assuming then, as indeed was the case in Southam v . Gouthro, 111
that a judge will not presume to evaluate the objective of a striking union, "lawful purpose" is put to one side . Emerging as a
likely basis of visiting tort liability upon striking unions is the
"unlawful means" phase of the conspiracy liturgy . This poses the
121 Aid., at p . 704 (emphasis added) .
127 Ibid., at p . 689 .
128 Ibid., at p . 691 .
129 Supra, footnote 75 .
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third problem : what factors invite group liability for conduct
innocently done by an individual?
Unlawful means, as was acknowledged in the Crofter"° case,
include nominate torts and crimes . To these the Canadian courts
have added violations of the Labour Relations Acts, which render
actionable, in conspiracy, strikes which were formerly innocent,
and not prescribed if done by one individual, merely because of
prematurity or other noncompliance with the Act. In Southam v.
Gouthro, although treating picket-line violence as the illegal
means upon which to found an action of conspiracy, Wilson J.
indicated that a strike in breach of P.C . 1003 would be an actionable conspiracy to do an unlawful act;"' the element of agreement, however, not being made out, liability was imposed on
other grounds. The fact that the learned judge relied on the definition of a criminal conspiracy stated by Willes J. in Mulcahy v.
The Queen 132 (which was also cited in Crofter) directs attention
away from the "lawfulness of object" inquiry to solely that of
"lawfulness of acts". Acts forbidden by statute are unlawful,
hence their employment as the means to legitimate ends invokes
liability for conspiracy, though the acts are not per se actionable .
In Dewar v. Dwan, 111 a group of Canadian Confederation of
Labour unionists sought to hold American Federation of Labor
members liable for conspiracy to injure, alleging that they had
been discharged as a result of a threat by defendants to strike,
which would have been contrary to the Ontario Labour Relations
Act. McRuer C.J.H .C. conceded that a cause of action might
thereby accrue to the struck employer, but rejected the notion
that it gave plaintiffs a cause of action . Stated in this fashion, the
decision is hard to reconcile with that in Therien v. Teamsters, 134.
the acts being qualitatively identical. It does not matter that the
legislation per se gives no cause of action to the plaintiff. Mere unlawfulness supports a conspiracy action . It would have been more
tenable, it is submitted, to dismiss this and similar conspiracy
actions out of hand on the basis of the Ontario Rights of Labour
Act. 135 However, the learned Chief Justice was unwilling to try the
unknown
130 Supra,
footnote 99, at p . 462, per Lord Wright, at p . 445 per Viscount
Simon, L.C.
131 Supra, footnote 75, at p .
188 .
131 "A conspiracy consists
not merely in the intention of two or more,
but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a
lawful act by unlawful means." (1868), L.R . 3 H .L. 306, at p . 317.
133 (1957), 11 D .L.R . (2d) 130 (Ont .) .
134 Supra, footnote 66.
115 Supra, footnote 34, s . 3(1) .
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"This Act", he pointed out, "has not been applied or interpreted in any
case, and I do not intend to apply or interpret it in this case." 136

Two further Ontario cases suggest judicial repeal of the Rights
of Labour Act. In Fokuhl v. Raymond, 137 a union official took the
position that a subcontractor, not being a "bona fide electrical
contractor", nor a member of the Association with which the
union had contracts, was not to work on a union job. He therefore forced the plaintiff subcontractor's employees, who were
union men, but who had no valid collective agreement, to quit
their jobs so that the subcontract could not be performed and
would have to be terminated . In Newell v. Barker"' two union
officials forced termination of a subcontract with a non-union
employer by threatening to call a strike of the principal employer.
A strike in either case would have violated now-section 49 of
the Ontario Labour Relations Act."' In neither case was this
argued . In the Fokuhl case, the Ontario Court of Appeal found,
obiter dicta, that in quitting work, plaintiff's employees had made
themselves liable in conspiracy, although liability was imposed
on a different basis
The sole purpose of that combination was to compel the respondent
to give up and terminate his contractual relations with the Austin
Company and thus to injure him . A combination for that purpose
. . . would plainly be unlawful and actionable .146

This was regarded as a conspiracy to injure ("wrongful purpose")
by interfering with contractual relations ("wrongful means").
Undoubtedly, the result of the case is proper because, as Roach
7.A. pointed out, "The record is replete with illustrations of the
power (defendant) wielded, and his "yen" to demonstrate that
power" . 141
In the Newell case, the Supreme Court of Canada drew a different inference as to "wrongful means" from facts which appear
to differ only in the way in which the language of diplomacy differs
from that of the marketplace
Throughout the evidence establishes that the respondents did no more
than what they individually conceived to be their respective duties as
officers of the union . . . . 148

The court goes on to find that there was no evidence to support
136 Supra, footnote 133, at p . 140.
x3r [194914 D.L .R . 145 (Ont. C.A .) .
133 [1950] S .C .R . 385, [195012 D .L .R. 289 .
x39 R.S .O ., 1950, c . 194, s . 49 am. S .O ., 1954, c . 42, s . 14 .
i4x Ibid., at p. 176.
110 Supra, footnote 137, at p . 156.
142 Supra, footnote 138, at p. 296.
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liability for conspiracy to injure . Moreover, as Rand J. pointed
out, citing the Crofter case :

It is now established beyond controversy that in the competition
between workmen and employers and between groups of workmen,
concerted abstention from work for the purpose of serving the interest
of organized labour is justifiable conduct . . . .
A building contractor who, in the conditions of labour organization
today, contemplates available labour as unaffected by its own special
interests, proceeds on a false assumption ; he is familiar with the everyday refusal of union employees, for a variety of reasons, to enter upon
work143

Despite the ephemeral quality of dicta, the Newell decision is
surely significant. First of all, throughout the entire litigation,
the Rights of Labour Act was not once judicially referred to.
Secondly, although the Fokuhl decision technically rested on interference with contract, and did not discuss the Crofter case, dicta
in that case indicated a willingness to find liability for conspiracy.
If reconcilable in formula with Newell, Fokuhl is thus totally
irreconcilable in result . 144 Fokuhl, however, was not discussed in
Newell, and thus cannot be taken to be overruled. Finally, the
Fokuhl decision turned upon the phraseology of a "cause of action," while Newell represented a closer examination of the facts.
Rand J., at least, was able to approach the problem in terms of
the actionability of a strike as a social phenomenon, while the
Ontario courts in the Fokuhl case, were left to grapple with verbal formulae .
In a recent New Brunswick decision, 145 the "right" to refuse
to deal with an uncertified union, purportedly granted by the
Labour Relations Act, was held to have been violated by a recognition strike . Those who engaged in such a strike were said
to have engaged in an "unlawful combination", for which they
were held liable in damages.
The use of breaches of the statute as illegal acts upon which
to found a conspiracy action is by no means inevitable . In Coles
143 Aid., at pp. 299-300.
144 The
decisions are the more surprising because in Fokuhl the pressure
was at least directed towards the primary party to the dispute, the plaintiff, while in Newell, the pressure was secondary. The remoteness of pressure was considered in neither case.
145 Merloni
v. Acme Construction, supra, footnote 46. "The predominant
purpose of those who promoted the strike, and were directing the picketing
was . . . to circumvent the Labour Relations Act . . . . the cessation of work
was to be obtained and thereby recognition of the union compelled or the
plaintiff put out of business." (at para. 11, 670). Ritchie J., in this case,
fashioned from whole cloth a code of conduct for uncertified unions -a
feat the New Brunswick legislature has yet to attempt.
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v. Cunningham '141 an action was brought (i) to enjoin picketing

by seamen who had quit their ship in violation of section 251 of
the Canada Shipping Act,"' and (ii) for damages for conspiracy
in tying up plaintiff's ship. In refusing the injunction, Coady J.
held that the illegality of the "strike" did not affect the legality of
the picketing. Conversely, it can be argued that in the action for
conspiracy (which was not dealt with at that time) the unlawful
act was not referable to the conspiracy alleged to have caused the
damage.
This, indeed, is the thrust of the argument by Wilson J. in
Aristocratic Restaurants v. Willianis, 111 also a picketing case in
which damages for conspiracy were sought . Granted, said the
learned judge, that "if the acts agreed on and done are unlawful
per se and cause damage, an inquiry into the object of the conspiracy is not necessary" . 149 This leaves unresolved the further
question that "proof of dasnnurn absque injuria is not enough,
the damage must have been caused by an illegal act" J" Recovery
was therefore refused.
It is the necessity of proving the causal relationship between
the unlawful act and the damage suffered that may mitigate the
cumulative effect of conspiracy plus breach of statute. Admitted
that it is for the conspiracy and not for the wrongful acts per se
that liability is imposed. Nonetheless, it is hard to see why a strike
for legitimate objectives should be actionable before resort to conciliation as required by the statute, and not after. The unlawfulness is referable only to the timing of the strike (the parties being
free to reject the conciliation report) ; the onus should thus be
thrown on the plaintiff to show that the timing caused him a loss
which he would not otherwise have borne.
To hold that any unlawfulness makes actionable an otherwise
lawful "conspiracy" would involve serious consequences . A strike
held in pursuance of the statutory requirements might become an
actionable conspiracy because of a single incident of picket-line
violence, or breach of a municipal no-handbill by-law . Clearly,
though the conspiracy element creates an independent and superadded liability for wrongful acts done in pursuance of it,"' the
liability ought, at least, to be confined to the damage flowing from
(1953), 10 W. W.R . (N .S.) 507 (B .C.) .
1952, c . 29 .
8 [1950] 4 D .L.R . 548, revs'd., [1951] 3 D.L .R. 769 (B.C .C .A.) ;
revs'd ., [1951] S .C.R. 762.
M [1950] 4 D .L.R. at p . 551 .
M Ibid., at p . 554.
161 Southam v . Gouthro, supra, footnote 75 .
116

117 R.S .C.,
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the wrongful acts, as opposed to those which are lawful . In the
case of strikes altogether forbidden by statute, e.g. strikes in
breach of a collective agreement, or for some other legislatively
proscribed objective, all the natural consequences of the strike
could be said to have been caused by the conspiracy ."'
Thus, the factors which invite liability for group action appear
to be conceptual rather than factual. Breaches of provisions of the
Labour Relations Acts have been used as ciphers in the formula
"wrongful means plus concerted activity equals cause of action".
Liability for conspiracy to injure purportedly turns upon evaluations of the purpose and conduct of the defendant-factual matters-but no analysis of the facts seems to take place. Rather an
emotional correlation develops between seemingly antisocial
activity contravening vaguely-stated standards, and conspiracy
to injure . In sum, the conspiracy cases defy reconciliation,"' and
although the Canadian cases provide no recent examples of liability for a strike simpliciter under the doctrine, one is driven to
three conclusions
(a) "It is not necessary to construct any specious theory by
virtue of which combination is sought to be made the
basis of unlawfulness . Combined activity is a single cir
cumstance whose illegality is discoverable in impairment
of the right to a free and open market ." 154
(b) The tort is conceptually at odds with the statutory plan
of collective bargaining, and its corollary of concerted
action by unions . The common law, always suspicious of
numbers, developed the tort of conspiracy in the latter
part of the nineteenth century in response to the thenprevailing antipathy towards concerted economic activity ."' Far from sharing this antipathy towards concerted
action, modern collective bargaining legislation presupposes its necessity to equalize the management-labour
"z Therien v . Teamsters, supra, footnote 66 .
153 See
Crofter v. Veitch, supra, footnote 50, at p . 472 per Lord Wright .
15 4 Teller, op . cit ., supra, footnote 97, at p . 46 ; cf. Kennedy and Finkelman, op. cit ., supra, footnote 23, pp . 58-92 .
"'Bryan, Development of the English Law of Conspiracy (1909), ch.
v., esp . p . 146 et . seqq. ; Haslam, Law Relating to Trade Combinations
(1931), ch . 2 ; Sayre, op . cit., supra, footnote 97, at p . 412 et seqq. The
criminal antecedents of the tort have had a longer and better researched
history. It has also been suggested that this antipathy was directed onesidedly against .labour. Gregory, Labor and the Law (1955), ch. 2, "Free
Enterprise in England-The Double Standard" . Cf. Friedmann, The
Harris Tweed Case and Freedom of Trade, supra, footnote 97, at p . 6.
Forkosch, Labor Law (1953), suggests this was "an economic flip-flop
but not a legalistic about-face . . . ," (p . 380).
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contest.156 With legislation pointing in one direction and
the conspiracy doctrine in the other, little wonder that
courts stand bewildered at the cross-roads. So long as
the concerted activity is within the allowable statutory
limits, the road is clear; once it runs afoul of these limits,
the courts are apt to seize upon the conspiracy doctrine
as an available tool to fashion a result that they deem
just. Unfortunately, the tool is inappropriate to the job
at hand, having been developed to deal with quite another evil.
Nor are the objections to the use of the conspiracy doctrine purely historical . There are serious misgivings because of the vagueness of the authorities, as well as the
latitude given by the doctrine to individual judges ;"' witness : the legislative repudiation of the doctrine in England fifty years ago,15s in the United States twenty-five
years ago,161 and in several Canadian jurisdictions .",'
(c) Finally, the doctrine is superfluous. To the extent to which
it has been utilized to make actionable the infliction of
injury which cannot be identified under the more tradi157

"I To some extent, a parallel development is discernible in the common
law. See Friedmann, ibid., at p . 2 (comment on the evolution in English
judicial thinking on economic individualism over the past fifty years) ; cf.
Friedmann, Social Security and Some Recent Developments In the Common Law, supra, footnote 97, at p. 379 ; McAllister, Case and Comment,
(1956), 34 Can . Bar Rev. 587, at p . 589 . For legislative attitudes, see Laskin,
op. cit., supra, footnote 79 ; Rand, op. cit ., supra, footnote 6, pp . 41-2 . It
is noteworthy that the original Ontario Collective Bargaining Act contained a repudiation of the civil conspiracy doctrine : S .O ., 1943, c . 4, s .
3(1) . For expressions of the American policy, see Wagner Act (1935),
s . 1 : "It is hereby declared to be the official policy of the United States to
. . . [encourage] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
. . . full freedom of association . . . ." See also Cox, op. cit ., supra, footnote
77, at p . 322 : "The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of the belief
that the conflicting interests . . . can be adjusted only by private negotiation, backed, if necessary, by economic weapons, without the intervention
of law ."
157 "The indefiniteness of the law of conspiracy to injure prevents it
from being a practical guide to workmen as to what they may do in times
of strike and what they must avoid . . . . The law of conspiracy to injure is
a law unfitted for workmen in case of trade disputes ." Report of Royal
Commission on Trade Disputes (1906), Cd . 2825, p . 89 . See also Crofter
v. Veitch, supra, footnote 50, at p. 472.
153 Warm, op . cit ., supra, footnote 97, at p . 261 et . seqq . ; S .A.D.S .,
Note, (1942-4), 8 Camb . L.J . 101, at p . 102 ; Friedmann, The Harris Tweed
Case and Freedom of Trade, supra, footnote 97, at p. 6 .
"'Trade Disputes Act (1906), 6 Edw . VII, c . 47, s . 1 (Am. Conspiracy
and Protection of Property Act (1875), 38 & 39 Vict., c . 86, s . 3) .
"I Norris-La Guardia Act (1932),
ss. 4-5, 47 stat. 70-1, 29 U .S .C.A .
104, 5 (limiting substantive entitlement to labour injunctions in United
States federal courts) .
"I Trade Unions Act, R.S .N., 1952, c . 262, s . 4 ; Rights of Labour Act,
R .S.O,, 1950, c. 341, s . 3(1) ; Trade Unions Act, R .S .S ., 1953, c. 259, s . 22 .
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tional heads of recovery, it has been assigned the role
filled by the prima facie tort doctrine in the United
States . 162 That doctrine at least has the virtue of demanding
a clearer exposition of the competing social interests 163
than does the conspiracy formulation in terms of "lawful" 'or "wrongful" . If the conduct complained of to
make the conspiracy actionable is itself actionable, then
conspiracy adds nothing. If the conduct is not traditionally actionable if done by one, then rather than make liability turn upon numbers, it is our traditional conceptions
of tort liability which should be re-examined.
VII. Intentional Interference With Another's Rights .

Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact damage another
in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.164

This classic English formulation of the doctrine appears to have
found wide support in the United States, as the theory of prima
facie liability for the unjustified infliction of harm, largely advanced by Holmes J. in an early article in the Harvard Law Review. 166 Certainly, legal opinion diverges widely on the limits of
liability. Fidelity to the historical antecedents of the doctrine, as
well as an appreciation of its potential abuse, have led to proposals
that it Pe narrowly confined"' or rejected altogether as a mode of
analysis ."'
161 Teller, op . cit., supra, footnote 97 ; Haslam, op . cit ., supra, footnote
155, p . 191 et . seqq . ; Smith, Labor Law (1950), pp . 78-81 ; Forkosch,
op . cit., supra, footnote 155, ch. 8 ; Prosser, op. cit., supra, footnote 89,
p . 732 ; Rand, op . cit., supra, footnote 6, at p . 38 ; Hale, Prima Facie
Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance (1946), 46 Col . L . Rev. 196 ;
Lathorp, Note, (1943), 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1143, at p. 1144.
163 See infra, next section.
164 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co . (1889), 23 Q .B.D.
598, at p . 613 (C .A .), aff'd ., [1892] A .C. 25 .
166 Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894), 8 Harv . L. Rev . 1 ;
Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), 167 Mass . 92, 44 N.E . 1077 ; Plant v . Woods
(1900), 176 Mass . 492, 57 N.E. 1011 ; Aikens v . Wisconsin (1904), 195 U.S .
194 . For general discussions of the doctrine, see Kennedy and Finkelman,
op . cit ., supra, footnote 23 ; Hale, op. cit ., supra, footnote 162 ; Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract (1922), 36 Harv. L . Rev. 663 ; Carpenter,
Interference With Contract Relations (1927), 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728.
166 Sayre, ibid., suggests that the remedy ought to be confined to cases
where the defendant has appropriated for himself the very advantages
sought by plaintiff.
167 Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts (1944), 8 Camb . L.J . 238,
suggests that torts is an interest-balancing process, and that discussion
of "rights and wrongs", "lawful and unlawful" acts, common in the
prima facie cases, is essentially question-begging .
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Looked at as a general theory of liability, under which may be
subsumed conspiracy, inducing or procuring breach, and interference with legal rights, the prima facie tort doctrine may well
be a convenient analytical aid. Indeed, Holmes J., in his article
indicated that he was only propounding a method of understanding cases, not of deciding them.
The American development in the labour law area focused on
the issue of "justification", recognizing that the conflicting interests
of labour and management render inevitable the deliberate infliction of harm . In so doing, the social issues were brought to the
fore and subjected to scrutiny. The method was essentially a threestep process of cognition that :
(i) The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of
social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be
obtained merely by logic and the general propositions of law
which nobody disputes .101
(ii) The issue is narrowed to the question whether, assuming that
some purposes would be a justification, the purpose in this case
of the threatened boycotts and strikes was such as to justify the
threats . 169
(iii) The legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the
law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed .110

As applied to labour cases, the American doctrine of just cause
has taken the formulation that:
Workers are privileged intentionally to cause harm to another by
concerted action if the object and means of their concerted action
are proper ; they are subject to liability to the other for harm so caused
if either the object or the means of their concerted action is improper .171

Translated into successive steps as an analytical tool, the doctrine
looks to (i) the invasion of a legally recognized right of the employer, (ii) by union action judicially peaceful, legal, and not condemned by public policy, (iii) in furtherance of a primary motive
of self-betterment, and (iv) some overbearing public policy which
should dictate the result no matter how the earlier questions were
resolved 172 At the fourth level, that of overbearing public policy,
168
Vegelahn v . Guntner, supra, footnote 165, at p. 106 (Mass .), at p .
1080 (N.E .) .
11a Plant
v. Woods, supra, footnote 165, at p . 505 (Mass .), at p . 1016
(N.E .).
171 Johnson v. United States (1908), 163 F . 30 (1st . Cir.), at p. 32, per
Holmes J.
171 American Law Institute, Restatement, Torts, s . 775 . There is likewise a privilege to threaten to engage in privileged activity : s . 783 .
172 Forkosch, op .[cit ., supra, footnote 155, s . 160 .
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the just cause doctrine reveals its weakness as a method of deciding
cases, 173 though retaining utility as a purely analytical device. 174
All the criticisms levelled at the courts for abuses of the "wrongful
purpose" limb of conspiracy to injure are germane here to the
abuse of the doctrine ofjust cause. Nonetheless, it is not improbable
that, in the main,

As the community conscience has grown more sensitive, the prima
tort doctrine has helped to bring the law of torts into closer
alliance with general good ethics .17
In England (and Canada), the outcome of the prima facie tort

facie

5

doctrine has been rather less happy . In introducing his chapter
on "Interference with Advantageous Relations", Dean Wright
observes :
. . . we launch on troubled waters which are studded with the rocks
176

on which many an action has foundered-"rights", "malice", "intention", "lawful", and "unlawful" acts . . . .

The English approach has been bifurcated : on the one hand
anarchical licence for commercial competition by means fair and
foul, 17$ up to the point of acts unlawful per se; on the other hand
sanctity of contract, interference with which probably admits of
no justification,"" at least in the pre-Crofter 131 judicial attitude
"I

173 Ibid., s. 162 ; Warm, op . cit., supra, footnote 97 ; Frankfurter and
Greene, op. cit ., supra, footnote 1, pp. 24-46.
Forkosch, op . cit., supra, footnote 155, p. 420 .
Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine (1952), 52 Col. L. Rev.
503, at p. 504 .
For an amazing example of the English attitude, see Pollock, on
Torts (14th ed., 1939), at p. 43 ff., where Landon, ed., attacks Pollock
bitterly for the prima facie tort formulation . See also Excursus C, at p.
252 . Nonetheless, the traditional intentional tort of trespass-to person
or property -has long recognized a principle ofjustification . See Fleming,
Torts (1957), ch. 5.
177 Wright, Cases on Torts (2d. ed., 1958), p. 865 .
118 "English law . . . has for better or worse adopted the test of selfinterest or selfishness as being capable of justifying the deliberate doing
of lawful acts which inflict harm, so long as the means employed are not
wrongful . . . we live in a competitive or acquisitive society, and the
English common law may have felt that it was beyond its power to fix
by any but the crudest distinctions the metes and bounds that divide the
rightful from the wrongful use of the actor's own freedom . . . . If further
principles of regulation or control are to be introduced, that is a matter
for the legislature." Crofter v. Veitch, supra, footnote 50, at p. 472 per
Lord Wright. See also Earle, Law Relating to Trade Unions (1869), p. 12 ;
Mogul v . McGregor, supra, footnote 164 ; Ware and Defreville v . M.T.A.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 40 (C.A.) ; Thompson v . New South Wales Branch of the
B.M.A ., [1924] A.C. 764 ; Sorrell v. Smith, supra, footnote 50.
179 Tarleton v . M'Gawley (1794), 1 Peake N.P.C. 270, 170 E.R. 153 ;
National Phonograph Co . v. Edison-Bell Cons. Phono . Co ., [1908] Ch. 335
(C.A.) ; Pratt v . B .M.A ., [1919] 1 K.B. 244 (apparently overruled by
Thompson v. N.S. W. Branch of B.M.A ., supra, footnote 177, 40 L.Q. Rev.
389).
Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 E. & B. 216,118 E.R. 749 (Q .B .) ; Temperton
v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 715 ; Quinn v. Leathem, supra, footnote 102 ;
174
175

175

180
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towards labour unions . Liability for unjustified infliction of harm
is thus not seen by the English courts as the enunciation of a
broad principle of which interference with contractual relations is
but one instance."' Just as attention focuses on interference with
an a priori contractual right to the exclusion of justification,"'
other a priori rights can be developed : a right to earn a living,184
to carry on business,"' to refuse to bargain with a union subject
to legislation. At the same time, even the narrow tort of inducing
breach of contract has potential for wide abuse to the extent that
the strict requirements"' of the tort are ignored . This, as will
appear, has been the trend of the Canadian case law, though the
English progenitur was long ago laid to rest by statute."'
In Fokuhl v. Raymond which, as has been suggested, was really
a strike situation, the union pursued its policy in the teeth of
plaintiff's subcontract . The proferred justification was rejected at
trial :
No doubt [said LeBel J.] the acts which prompted the interference
with the plaintiff's subcontract were concerned with bringing conditions into line with union policy, with which the Court has no concern, but if the acts were in violation of the plaintiff's legal rights, and
were committed knowingly, the defendants cannot be heard to say
that the interest of the Union justifies their conduct. If that were so,
contractual rights would be subservient to the general interests of a
trade union, and this was clearly never the law. 181
186

Read v. Friendly Society, [190212 K.B. 732 (C .A .) ; South Wales Miners'
Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co ., [1905] A.C. 239; Larkin v. Long, [1915]
A.C . 814 ; see especially Sorrell v. Smith, supra, footnote 50, at p. 713 per
Viscount Cave L.C. For authority contra : Smithies v. N.A .O .P., [19091
1 K.B. 310 (C .A .) (pursuit by union of its own contractual rights) ; Brimelow v. Casson, [1924] 1 Ch. 302 (contracts broken forced underpaid
circus employees to prostitution) Pratt v. B.M.A ., supra, footnote 179,
at p. 265 (dicta re privileged conduct) ; Citrine, Trade Union Law (1950),
pp . 444-6.
181 Laskin, Labour
Law : 1923-1947 (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 286, at
p. 298.
182 Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, supra,
footnote 175.
188 See Kennedy and Finkelman, op . cit., supra, footnote
23, pp . 70-76

for a discussion of justification in the English law of inducing breach .
Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1 ; Quinn v. Leathem, supra, footnote 102.
Mogul v. McGregor, supra, footnote 164.
Lyons v. Wilkins, [1896] 1 Ch. 811, [1899] 1 Ch. 255 (C.A .) .
'a' See Thomson v. Deakin, [1952] Ch. 646 (C .A.), for the requirements
of the tort.
118 Trade Disputes Act (1906), 6 Edw. VII, c. 47, s. 3.
181 [19481 3 D.L.R. 11, at p. 25 ; foll'd . Bevaart v. Flecher, supra, footnote 46, (picketing by American Federation of Labour in jurisdictional
dispute with "Christian Labour Association", resulting in liability because
of refusal of unionists to cross picket line) . But see Roach J.A.'s dictum:
"It is trite law that it is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there be no sufficient justification
" Fokuhl v. Raymond, supra, footnote 137, at p. 174 (italics added) .
No justification was found .
I"
185
188
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It was indeed this very situation of which Professor Sayre disapproved"' twenty-five years earlier (in an era much less tolerant of
unionism) in questioning the Glamorgan decision,"' beyond which
the provincial courts 182 seem reluctant to progress.
Although the "yellow-dog" contract device revealed in the
Hitchman Coal case 193 has been statutorily repudiated, 191 the imposition of liability for strikes as procuring breach of employment
contracts is analogous, and requires analogous treatment: 191
The fundamental question in the Hitchman case was whether or not
one set of interests should be sacrificed to another . To answer this
deep lying problem, involving momentous social consequences, by a
mere rule of thumb that defendant induced a breach of plaintiff's
contract, is hardly a method calculated to produce justice.""
The statutory collective agreement provision 197 for arbitration of

"all difference between the parties" appears to offer a means of
imposing liability for all concerted activity during the currency of
an agreement as inducing breach of contract ."" There thus inheres
"o "Suppose, again, that an employer, fearing the approach of labour
troubles, makes contracts with his customers requiring the delivery of
his finished products by a certain date, and then advertises the contracts
among his workmen, knowing that the time is so short that any strike
will make it impossible to finish the goods by the required time and thus
cause a breach of contract. Surely no such contract would make illegal
and therefore enjoinable a bona fide strike for higher wages . . . . The law
cannot allow one by any such device effectively to paralyse otherwise
lawful activities." (op . cit., supra, footnote 165, at p. 682).
191 Supra,
footnote 180.
192 See e .g . Fokuhl
v . Raymond, supra, footnote 137 ; Pacific Western
Planing Mills v. International Woodworkers ofAmerica ; Bevaart v. Flecher,
supra, footnote 46. But compare the decision of Rand J. in Newell v .
Barker, supra, footnote 138.
"s Hitchman Coal & Coke Co . v. Mitchell (1917), 245 U.S . 229 (procur-

ing breach of contract not to join union) .
194 See e .g. Ont . Labour Relations Act, s. 47(b) ; B.C. Labour Relations
Act, s. 4(2)(b) .
19,1
See R.S.N., 1952, c. 262, s. 5.
198
Sayre, supra, op . cit., footnote 165, at pp. 695-6 . The choice of the
"rule of thumb" by the judge is, of course, a policy decision, albeit a
decision sub rosa. Cf. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1957
ed.), p. 294 et seqq.
187 See
e .g . Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 32 ; B.C. Labour Relations
Act, s. 22.
118 Wheaton
v. United Bro, of Carpenters (1956), 6 D.L.R. (2d)'7500
(B.C.) ; Wilson Court Apts . v . Jenovese (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 758 (Ont.).
In both cases, the union took the position that the grievance clause did
not apply to the subject-matter of the dispute . In the Ontario case, McRuer
C.J.H.C. dismisse d the union's offer to arbitrate if work were meanwhile
suspended, and enjoined picketing. Although the statutory arbitration
clause was in fact meant to prevent work stoppages, the facts reveal no
collective agreement to which arbitration could be applied. In the B.C.
case, damages were awarded for inducing breach when the union certified
for the plaintiff's employees bowed to a jurisdictional demand by another
union, and refused to perform certain work. The court suggested resort
to arbitration should have been had . See also Therien v . Teamsters, supra,
footnote 66.
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in every collective agreement (as in the "yellow-dog" contract), a
trigger for liability under the inducing breach doctrine . The impropriety of these strikes is clear, and the imposition of civil
liability may well be a brake on undesirable work stoppages. However, the position of a union trapped in no man's land, in which
it cannot resort to arbitration because there is a dispute other
than "the interpretation, application, administration or alleged
violation of the agreement", and cannot resort to self-help because
of the statutory strike ban suggests at least one situation where to
procure a strike during the currency of the agreement is not necessarily to procure a breach of the agreement.119
Typical of the imposition of liability for procuring a strike as
procuring breach of contracts of employment is the statement of
Coady 7. in the Pacific Western case :
To induce or persuade plaintiff's employees to break their contracts
of employment is per se an unlawful act, a tortious act, 110

Typical, likewise, is the failure of the judge to advert to the contractual status of the employees which would seem to be most
obscure, their collective agreement having expired . Finally, the
logical extension of this approach would be extensive liability for
anyone who pickets to procure a strike where the employees are
either under contract or employed at will-which covers all employment situations . This, nonetheless, was the basis for injunctions
in numerous cases?01 Picketing aimed at procuring a strike which
would (presumptively) result in the breach of employment contracts was enjoined . The significance of this is twofold : (i) a relaxation of the strict factual requirements of the inducing breach doctrine, 101 and (ii) as in Fokuhl v. Raymond, a refusal to consider
justification for procuring the strike .
In the Bennett and White case, in addition to an injunction, an
award of damages was sustained on appeal . A clear line was
drawn between the conspiracy cases, where justification was held
relevant, and the inducing breach cases, where it was not. Upon
their failure to organize a subcontractor's employees, the defendant
-199In the area of union security, resort to the courts seems also to have

been foreclosed, McLaughlin v. Westward Shipping (1959), 21 D .L .R .
(2d) 770 (B .C .) .
200
Supra, footnote 46, at p . 655 .
211 Comstock, Mid3vestern v. Scott, [1953] 4 D.L .R. 316 (B .C .) ; Belleville
Lock v. Tyner, supra, footnote 41 ; Todd, Bolton v. Toinson (1956), 6
D .L.R . (2d) 711 (B .C .) ; Bennett & White v . Van Reeder, supra, footnote
46 ; Dativson, glade v. Tunnel, etc . Union of Canada, supra, footnote 46 ;
Wilson Court v. Tenovese, supra, footnote 198 ; Canadian Overseas Shipping
v . Kake, [1958] O .W.N. 300 ; Merloni v. Acme Construction, supra, footnote
46 .
202 Recently enunciated in Thomson v. Deaken, supra, footnote 187 .
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union picketed a construction project. The picket line was respected by other employees, and the principal contractor (the
principal employer) sued. Not only was it held that absent a collective agreement with either the principal or subcontractor, the
defendant "had no Trade Union rights to protect","' but in fact,
justification was not an issue at all :
. . . appellants formed the picketline for the immediate if not predominant purpose of procuring the breach of contract. It may be accepted that they also had in mind to advance thereby the interests
of their Trade Union, but this is not justification for committing a
tortious act that in itself created common law liability. `14

Apparently, then, the holding that a legal right has been violated
concludes the justification problem, there being no violation where
the conduct is privileged or justified. The reasoning here is similar
to that in the "conspiracy to injure" cases.
The Fokuhl case was decided in the Ontario Court of Appeal
primarily upon the authority of Lumley v. Gye, which was,
. . . stated by Lord MacNaghten, with comprehensive brevity, in
Quinn v. Leathem . . . "A violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and . . . it is a violation of a legal right to
interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there be no
sufficient justification for the interference " . 20%

However, the moral outrage of the court foreclosed any calm consideration of justification. The defendant's "high-handed, dictatorial assumption of power" 2°s in ordering plaintiff's employees
off the job, thus causing him to lose his contract, was "unlawful
means employed for the purpose of putting an end to his contract" 207 "Justification" was thus analysed in terms of defendant's
"legal right" to do what he did, rather than "considerations of
policy and social advantage" ."'
Newell v. Barker, as has been suggested, is not easily to be
reconciled with the decision in Fokuhl v. Raymond. It is true that
Estey J. does point out that the defendants were not the "cause"
of the cancellation of plaintiff's contract, that the principal contractor "acted upon his own judgment" in cancelling the contract,
and that therefore "in these circumstances there was no interference on the part of the respondents with contractual relations
Supra, footnote 46, at p . 329 .
201Ibid., per Clinton J . Ford J .A .
2°c Ibid., at p . 159 .
Supra, footnote 137, at p . 153.
Ibid., at p . 156, but cf. "Had the claim been based upon a contention
that by some unlawful act of respondents the appellant had been disabled
from carrying out its obligations, it would also, in my opinion, fail ."
Newell v . Barker, supra, footnote 138, at p . 401, per Locke J.
20 Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra, footnote 168, per Holmes J.
203
205
20"
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within the meaning of the oft-quoted statement of Lord MacNaghten in Quinn v. Leatliem . . . ... 119 On the other hand, the learned
judge does say that defendants "were quite within their rights" in
warning the principal contractor of "the difficulties that the employment ofnon-union men upon the construction of this building
would involve","' citing the forty-year-old decision in the
Willianis and Rees 211 case. The absence of discussion of "justification" can be written off to the failure of the plaintiff to prove the
anterior fact of the intentional infliction of harm. The fact that the
defendants were "quite within their rights" in doing what they did
may well have been a makeweight in the court's reluctance to find
causation.
Rand J. makes a much more frontal approach to the justification problem. Citing Crofter, he points out that "concerted abstention from work for the purpose of serving the interest of organized
labour is justifiable conduct" 212 The mode of analysis, he suggests,
is to be found in the judgment of Viscount Simon in Crofter, and
the line to be drawn is between "malevolence or a primary intent
to injure a competitor" as distinguished from "strengthening or
defending a recognized and accepted social interest" . 213 Nonetheless, his judgment rests equally upon the fact that the contract
was not terminated by threats or coercion :

It is, I think, the proper view to attribute the cancellation of the contract not to the refusal of labour by the respondents, but to the chosen
course of action of the building contractor. The decision to abstain
may have been the controlling influence upon him, but whether we
attribute the rule to the balance of policy between these contending
factors, or to the election on the part of the building contractor, the
result is the same. If this were not so, by unitedly declining to associate
themselves with non-union workers, the respondents and their workmen would involve themselves in illegality brought about by the mere
fact that the desire of the building contractor for their labour was
stronger than that of observing the contract with Newell : by the offer
of work made them, they became involved in the necessity of either
accepting it with its objectionable conditions, or of avoiding collective refusal, or paying damages . To state that proposition in relation
to the circumstances with which we are dealing is, I think, to answer
it .214

Supra, footnote 138, at pp . 393-4.
Ibid., at p . 391 .
211 Supra, footnote 10. Although the union was not held liable in that
case, only Duff J. held that there was no cause of action . Anglin C.J .C .
and Brodeur, Idington, and Mignault JJ . would all have imposed liability
for wrongful invasion of a legal right, had they not divided evenly on the
suability of a union .
212 Supra, footnote 138, at p. 397.
214 Ibid., at pp . 398-9 .
213 Ibid .
109

M
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Upon this analysis, if instead of declining association with nonunion men, the refusal were to further a jurisdictional claim, a
boycott of "hot" goods, or any other union policy, there would
be no liability-save where some "recognized and accepted social
interest" outweighed the justification advanced.
The problem next reached the Ontario courts in the two Smith
Bros . Construction"' decisions. The facts were simple . Plaintiff, a
construction company, was engaged in five projects when ap
proached by officials of the carpenters' union for recognition.
When the company declined to bargain on the ground that the
union was uncertified, pickets were placed at the projects, the
owners of which were first notified. The picket lines were respected
both by plaintiff's employees, and those of his subcontractors. A
"Declaration of unlawful strike" was secured from the Ontario
Labour Relations Board,216 followed by an interim injunction
against "unlawfully interfering with the servants, agents, suppliers,
patrons or customers of the plaintiff" and "inducing breach of
contract" ;217 ultimately a permanent injunction went against "inducing breach ofcontract or interfering with contractual relations",
and damages were awarded.21s
In Smith Bros . No. I, relying on Fokuhl v. Raymond and Quinn
Leathem,
Wells J. enjoined the picketing on the basis of the
v.
facts set out in Smith's affidavit :

It is perfectly clear that the effect of setting up the picket lines, even
though they are peacefully set up and well-behaved, is to interfere without any legal justification in the contractual relation existing between
the plaintiff and the owners of the various properties picketed . . .
as a result of an unlawful strike certain very important contractual
rights between the plaintiff and third parties have been interfered
with, and for the moment abrogated, and this without justification .219

But the judgment rests equally on quite a different approach.
Insofar as the judgment looks to the policy of the Act and the
fact that the Board has labelled the "strike" unlawful, the injunction seems warranted.22° This, however, is not the same as liability
Supra, footnote 75 .
1950, c. 194, s. 59, am . S .O ., 1954, c. 42, s. 18 ; Smith Bros.
Construction & United Bro . Carpenters (1954), 2 Can . Lab . Serv. 76-443 .
(O .L .R .B .) .
217 (1954]
2 D .L .R. 117, at p . 123 .
218 (1955]
4 D .L .R. 255, at p . 262 ; foll'd . Har-A-Mac Construction Co .
v. Harkness, supra, footnote 75 . Plaintiff failed to prove the extent of his
damage, and recovery was therefore quite low .
219 Supra, footnote
217, at p . 122.
226 "[Defendants'
acts] are not only wrongful and contrary to the whole
policy of the Labour Relations Act, and indeed in direct breach of s. 50,
but they are obviously on the face of them dangerous and irresponsible ."
Ibid.
216

216 R.S .O .,
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for inducing breach . The difference is critical in the light of Smith
Bros . No . 2, for that decision expressly repudiated the Board's
declaration of an unlawful strike---thereby casting doubt upon
Smith Bros . No . 1, except insofar as recognition picketing was an
"unjustified interference with plaintiff's contractual rights".
In making out a case of inducing breach, McLennan J. in
Smith Bros . No . 2, looked to Viscount Simon's dictum in Crofter :

If C has an existing contract with A and B is aware of it, and if B
persuades or induces C to break the contract with resulting damage
to A, this is, generally speaking, a tortious act for which B will be
liable to A for the injury he has done him. In some cases, however, B
may be able to justify his procuring of the breach of contract . . . .221

On this formula, he found a breach had been induced in the case
of a project whose owner, threatened with picketing, instructed
plaintiff to leave the job. Justification was discussed in the context
of the statutory provisions :
There was a perfectly lawful way open to the Union of which defendants were members and officers, to obtain a collective bargaining
agreement with the plaintiff company under the provisions of the
Labour Relations Act . They endeavoured to short-circuit that machinery and . . . this was an unjustified interference with . . . contractual
relations, as a result of which the plaintiff suffered damage .` 2 '

In answer to the defendants' argument that no one was prevented
from working, McLennan J. held :
. . . if the development of the Trade Union movement has reached
the point where workers will not cross a picket line to go to work,
that is just as effective an interference with contractual relations as
any other form of restraint might be. Loyalty to the rule that I have
mentioned . . . should not be abused to a wrongful purpose and where
there is no justification . 2%3

Stated this broadly, picket lines which result in a work stoppage
are prima facie actionable. 224 Presumably, if the picket line is ever
to be allowed, there are some circumstances under which interference with contractual relations can be justified. This was not
such a case, but as a method of analysis, the factors which weigh
in the justification deserved clearer enunciation . In fact, it appears
that plaintiff was paying less than union rates, and that his refusal
was based not only upon the failure of the union to become certiSupra, footnote 99, at p . 442 .
223 1bid.
Supra, footnote 218, at p . 264.
224 The obvious qualification upon this
dictum is that liability turns
upon non-compliance with the statute, Merloni v. Acme Construction,
supra, footnote 46 . Thus, a happier phrasing of the doctrine would impose
liability not for "interference with contractual relations" but for conduct
below the statutory norm .
221
222
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fled, but also upon the ground that his employees were satisfied.
Had it not been for the finding that no strike in fact took place,
plaintiff could have pointed to the ban on strikes in advance of
certification under section 49(2), or on procuring an unlawful
strike under section 50. But the Ontario Act does not preclude
agreements with uncertified unions and is completely silent on the
ambit of lawful pressure short of strikes .226 It does not appear
whether the subcontractors whose employees refused to cross the
picket lines had collective agreements, which may or may not
have provided that the employees would not be required to work
on "unfair" projects . In short, although the facts given appear to
support the conclusion that the interference was unjustified, the
issue is by no means satisfactorily dealt with.
In Hammer v. Kemmis,226 recognition picketing again involved
union officers in liability for conspiracy to interfere with contractual
relations. In view of the acceptance of the trial judge's finding that
the picketing was aimed at interfering with plaintiff's existing contractual relations and punishing him for the alleged discriminatory
discharge of two employees, there was no discussion by the majority of justification. Davey J.A ., dissenting, felt compelled to reject
this finding of the trial judge and draw his own inferences from
the facts. For instance, plaintiff's wages and working conditions
were substandard and gave him an undue competitive advantage ;
attempts were made to sign a contract with him; and the discharge
of two employees was regarded by the union as discharge for
union activity, as a result of which an unfair practice charge was
laid. Plaintiff's marginal position as a wholesaler was certainly
jeopardized by the union's demands, but their restraint in attacking
only his wholesale, and not his retail, operations rebuts the inference that the union was acting in bad faith to ruin him, the more
so since other marginal wholesalers had survived unionization .
Davey J.A. went on to find that neither definite contracts nor unjustified interference were made out (and, parenthetically, that section 23(4) of the British Columbia Act contemplates the negotiation of agreements by uncertified unions : this being by way of
justification for the union's activity). The importance of the case
225
"An employer, if he chooses to do so voluntarily, may waive certification . . . and enter into a collective agreement with a trade union
representing a bargaining unit of his employees. An uncertified trade
union, however, cannot compel an employer to recognize it before it has
complied with all the requirements of the Act." Merloni v. Acme Construction, ibid., at p. 11, 673, per Ritchie J. This view is to be contrasted
with the rather more decorous and self-restrained view of Freedman J. in
Peerless Laundry v. Laundry etc. Workers, supra, footnote 75.
226
Supra, footnote 125.
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for understanding liability for strikes lies in the consideration of
justification for procuring breach, and the scope of that issue as
defined by the majority and minority opinions .
Two Ontario cases further obscure the inducing breach doctrine. In Dewar v. Dwan 227 the union escaped liability for conspiring
to "bring about the discharge or layoff of the Plaintiffs by the
threat of an unlawful strike" . 221 In Body v. Murdoch 229 defendants
were enjoined from ". . . causing or procuring a breach . . . of any
contracts between the Plaintiffs . . . " and their employer, the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation."' Both cases involved jurisdictional disputes. In each case, secondary pressure was exerted
(in Dewar by a threat to strike,"' in Body by a refusal to work)
which, qua the employer, was unlawful . In each case, plaintiffs
were discharged . In Dewar, McRuer C.J .H.C. hewed to the narrow
limits of inducing breach as set out in Thomson v. Deakin by
Jenkins L.J., and conspiracy to injure . He found an intention neither to procure a breach, nor to injure, but merely to effectuate a
long-standing policy (embodied in a collective agreement) not to
work with non-union men or members of a rival union. Talk of
intention to injure or to procure breach appears to subsume the
justification issue,"' but surely represents a conceptualistic note in
an otherwise perceptive appraisal of "a struggle between two groups
of Trade Unions". Stewart J. in Body, however, resorted to the
Fokuhl case, found a wrongful interference with plaintiff's contract
in that defendant's refusal to play was an unauthorized strike, and
issued an interlocutory injunction. In granting leave to appeal,
LeBel J. distinguished his own decision in Fokuhl by finding that
there was no express intention to procure breach, and that there
was no unlawful strike . The Court of Appeal was reluctant to
deal with the matter at the interlocutory stage, and left unresolved
this direct conflict between Stewart and LeBel JJ. below. The
latter's opinion is more consistent with Dewar, it is submitted,
because defendant's contract with the employer recognized the
defendant's obligation to his union, and provided that it would
not be interfered with. It is more consistent with Thomson v.
Deakin and Newell v. Barker in that the more rigid requirements
2-27 (1957), 11 D .L .R . (2d) 130 (Ont.) .
22$ Ibid., at p . 132, per McRuer C.J . H .C .
.29
[195414 D .L.R . 326 (Ont . H .C .), p . 334 (Ont . C .A.) .
250 Ibid., at p . 331 .
231 This was actually "tertiary" pressure, since
defendants threatened
to strike their own employer unless he had the sub-contractor discharge
plaintiffs .
232 Supra, footnote 227, at p . 133 .

1960]

Tort Liabilityfor Strikes in Canada

38 5

of inducing breach are adhered to . In the Body and Dewar cases,
strike action, uncomplicated by picketing, and in a jurisdictional
context is treated as interference with contractual relations . To
the extent to which liability was imposed, the cases can be taken
as a potential anti-strike weapon though, ironically, the interests
protected are not those of the struck employer.133
On the facts-although not in reasoning or result-the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Therien v. Teamsters" 4
is barely distinguishable from Dewar and Newell. Plaintiff in this
case was owner of a small fleet of trucks in British Columbia which
he had supplied, with drivers, for over ten years to City Construction Co . In addition, plaintiff himself drove one of the trucks .
Defendant union entered a collective agreement with the construction firm, covering the whole province, and purporting to apply
to sub-contractors hired by the company, which provided for a
union shop . In response to pressure from the !union, Therien's
employees became members, but Therien himself refused. The
union then told him that he would be put off the job, which result
they procured by threatening to "placard" City's jobs ; 235 fearing
a work-stoppage, City discontinued the use of Therien's trucks .
He sued and obtained an injunction and damages, which were
unanimously affirmed in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme
Court of Canada.
The basis of the judgments in all the courts is found in the
holding by Locke J. that :
. . . even though the dominating motive in a certain course of action
may be the furtherance of your own business or your own interests,
you are not entitled to interfere with another man's method of gaining his living by illegal means . . . to ascertain whether the means were
illegal, inquiry may be made both at common law and of the statute
law.236

In the courts below, both Clyne J. and DesBrisay C.J .B .C .
found unlawful both the union's objectives and the means employed to achieve them. As in Hammer v. Kemmis, Davey J.A.
showed a keen awareness of the labour relations realities of the
233 There is a long history of Canadian cases pursuing this theme,
which may reflect a praiseworthy concern for individual rights, if not a
conscious weighing of the competing interests . Sleuter (Sleuter) v . Scott ;
U.M. W.A . v. Willianz s & Rees ; Johnston v . Mackey, supra, footnote 11 .
234 Supra, footnote 66.
236 This must be taken to be a threat to stop work . (1958), 13 D.L.R .
(2d) 347, at p . 350 . If construed as picketing, simpliciter, reference to
breach of the no-strike provisions of the Act would be meaningless, although picketing would still, admittedly, be inconsistent with the promised
resort to arbitration .
236 Supra, footnote 37, at p . 13 .

38 6

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[VOL . XXXVIII

situation. He properly pointed out that the union was not so much
interested in obtaining plaintiff's membership as in forcing the
employment of a union man in his stead. On this basis, he disposed
of the alleged violation of section 4. He saw no merit in the charge
that the union aimed at "restricting services" under section 5(2),
citing Williams v . Aristocratic Restaurants . 23' But, showing due
concern for buttressing the employees' right to join a union or no,
he did find coercion that could reasonably have the effect of compelling plaintiff to join a union. "Coercion" he defined as "conduct
consisting, not merely of the force of rational argument, but of
the exertion ofpressure' 1,238 whether lawful in itself or not, including
social or economic pressure. Lest this destroy the union shop, he
pointed out that the institution is specifically preserved by section
8 of the Act, although this contract clause did not in terms refer
to Therien. He, alone, adverted to the issue of justification and
suggested that :
If the defendant did seek to attain its object by wrongful means, it
cannot be justified by proving lawful purpose.' s

The means being coercion forbidden by statute, no justification
can be advanced . This position appears to be adopted in the judgment of Locke J.
Finally, the one element of liability upon which all of the
judges are agreed is that the union's resort to a threat of economic
pressure to enforce its version of a collective agreement is unlawful,
short-circuiting the scheme of arbitration contemplated by the
agreement and the legislation. It is in the realm of determining the
lawfulness of concerted activity-quite as much as in finally deciding the suability of certified unions-that Therien represents a
landmark.
Liability is founded upon violation of a substantive provision
of the legislation viewed as a datum of public policy rather than
as an express grant of redress, and liability is phrased so as to
permit the pursuit of self-interest, provided the means used are not
unlawful.
A review of the cases involving "intentional interference with
legal rights" reveals that the cases are split on the liability of parties
to a jurisdictional dispute to each other,"' on liability for secondary
pressure causing discharge of a subcontractor 241 because of a threat

[1951] S .C.R . 762, at p . 782, per Kerwin C .J.C.
(1959), 16 D .L.R . (2d) 646, at p . 660 .
239 Ibid., at p. 664 .
249 Body v . Murdoch, supra, footnote 229 (liability) ; Dewar v . Dwan,
supra, footnote 227 (no liability) .
241 Therien v . Teamsters, supra, footnote 66 (liability) ; Newell v . Barker,
supra, footnote 138 (no liability).
237
238
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to strike the principal employer, but unanimously condemn the
calling of a strike by either a stranger union,242 or a union which
has had dealings with plaintiff employer 211 at any stage short of
full compliance with the Act 244 or for any purpose other than
collective bargaining demands246 The importance 246 of liability for
calling a strike appears when it is realized that the defendants are
often officers and members of the union to which the strikers
themselves belong, so that the act of striking seems sure to visit
liability on the union whether action is brought for the strike or
for the inducing . In fact, the latter action is often a more convenient
form of the former, because it is deterrent rather than remedial.
To the extent to which the "intentional harm" omelet can be
verbally unscrambled, this has been done by Kennedy and Finkelman
(i) To commit any act which is clearly a tort, or to induce or pro-

cure another to commit such an act, is unlawful.
(ii) To induce or procure another to commit an act which is not a
tort, is not unlawful, even though this act injures a third party.
(iii) To induce or procure another to break his contract is unlawful,
unless there exists just cause or excuse. The full implication and
meaning of "just cause and excuse" in this connotation are still
in doubt.
(iv) To injure another through a combination is unlawful, unless
there exists just cause or excuse. In this connection, "just cause
or excuse" appears to mean some benefit to the combination
and this apart from intent to injure .
(v) whatever may be the case in criminal law, a combination, whose

m Bevaart v . Flecher ; Bennett & White v. Van Reeder ; Dawson, Wade
v. Tunnel etc. Union, supra, footnote 46 ; Smith Bros . v . Jones, No . I & 2,
supra, footnote 215 ; Merloni v . Acme Construction, supra, footnote 46.
243 Fokuhl v. Raymond, supra, footnote 137 ; Wheaton v. Carpenters ;
Wilson Court v . Jenovese, supra, footnote 198 ; Comstock, Midwestern v .
Scott ; Canada Overseas Shipping v . Kake, supra, footnote 201 .
244 Todd, Bolton v . Tomson, supra, footnote 201 ; Body v. Murdoch,
supra, footnote 229 ; Therien v. Teamsters, supra, footnote 66 ; Pacific
Western v . I. W.A . ; Dawson, Wade v . Tunnel etc . Union ; Smith Bros . v .
Jones, No . I & 2, ibid. ; Comstock Midwestern v . Scott ; Wilson Court Apts .
v . Jenovese, ibid. But see Dewar v. Dwan, supra, footnote 227 (contra) .
245
Bevaart v. Flecher, supra, footnote 46 ; Body v. Murdoch, supra,
footnote 229 (jurisdictional disputes) but see Dewar v . Dwan, ibid. ;
Canada Overseas Shipping v. Kake, supra, footnote 201, (use of pilots
although not required by law) ; Hammer v . Kemmis, supra, footnote, 125 ;
Dawson, Wade v. Tunnel etc. Union, ibid. ; Bennett and White v . Van Reeder,
supra, footnote 46; Smith Bros. Construction v. Jones, No . I & 2, supra,
footnote 75 ; Har-A-Mac v . Harkness, supra, footnote 75 ; Merloni v .
Acme Construction, supra, footnote 46, (recognition) .

245
For example, Carrothers' pioneering work, The Labour Injunction
In British Columbia (1956), shows that from 1946 to 1955, 75 labour
injunctions were sought, 68 granted, of which 5 were directed against
declaring a strike, 3 against supporting a strike, and 14 against persuading
employees not to work, inter alia (p . 203) .
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"main or ulterior" purpose is to injure, is unlawful, and incidental
benefit to the combination may be no excuse .
(vi) The combined action of several individuals doing what each
might lawfully do in his individual capacity will acquire a delictual character, if there is a common intent to injure. The
courts seem to have feared that a number of persons in combination may coerce or annoy where one person might not . 4

But their propositions, even to the extent to which they represent the mainstream of English law (to which Canadian courts
constantly resort), do not solve particular problems . The solutions
depend on the anterior selection of one or other of the half-dozen
categories and its application to fact situations which fit several. 248
And even if the selection process can be rationally justified, the
problem of application and interpretation of the rule remains.
And even if some degree of unanimity can be developed in this
area, the bald fact is that we are by no means sure that the solutions
thus arrived at are the ones most consistent with our labour policy
and statutes. The short answer to any criticism is that unions which
obey the legislation have nothing to fear from the courts ."' This,
indeed, may explain the relative scarcity of cases imposing liability
for strikes simpliciter. But surely the concern of the law is as much
with imposing liability on a correct basis where it is deserved as
with avoiding it where it is undeserved . If tort liability (as in
Therien) is to be pitched upon compliance with the statute, a
heavy onus of creative interpretation has been thrown upon the
courts, for the statutes themselves do not purport to be complete
codes of regulation ."'
VIII. Arbitration: An Alternative to Litigation?
In one isolated area, that of the "wildcat" strike in breach of the
no-strike clause of the collective agreement, a method of losscompensation (not-strictly speaking-tortious) seems to be
247 Kennedy and Finkelman, op . cit., supra, footnote 23, Preface . The
authors do not appear to have pursued their declared intention to treat
the problem philosophically in another volume .
248 It has even been suggested that the plaintiff may elect to frame his
action in "conspiracy" (where justification may be pleaded) or in "inducing breach of contract" (where it may not) . Fokuhl v. Raymond, [1948]
3 D .L.R . 11, at p. 21 . Cf. Bennett and White v. Van Reeder, supra, footnote
46, at p . 329 .
249 "If, after compliance with the procedure set out in the Labour
Relations Act, a strike is called it must, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, be presumed the predominant purpose of the strike is to further
the legitimate interests of the employees engaged in the strike and not to
damage the interests of the employer. Such a strike is clearly lawful . . . ."
Merloni v. Acnae Construction, supra, footnote 46, at p. 11, 673 .
ze9 Williams v . Aristocratic Restaurants, supra, footnote 237, at p . 787,
per Rand J.
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emerging entirely outside the traditional legal arena. Two recent
arbitration decisions 251 of Professor Laskin have held a union
liable in damages for an unauthorized work stoppage . The reasoning used to ascertain liability is out of the mainstream of Canadian
jurisprudence only because of its particular sensitivity towards
policy and facts . In the C.G.E. case, work stoppages occurred in
various departments in protest against the allegedly improper disciplinary suspension of the union chief steward. Article 21 of the
agreement provided that "during the term of this Agreement . . .
the union agrees that there shall be no slowdown, strike, or other
stoppage of or interference with work" . 211 The arbitration board
held that :

A union, seeking certification or otherwise seeking to negotiate a
collective agreement with an employer puts itself forward as a responsible party able to represent workers . This responsibility . . . involves in the first place exertion of discipline or control over members;
otherwise there can be no substance in collective agreements . . . .
How then is it met? . . . it would seem that the initial obligation of
the union should be to make known to the management that the
union has not authorized or encouraged the stoppage and thereafter
to give continued evidence of this position by manifest steps to bring
the stoppage to an end .'- 53

In fact, union officials appear to have actively directed the
stoppage, and certainly failed to take steps to end it. Whatever the
provocation for the stoppage 254 -which may or may not have been
a spontaneous gesture of protest-the union's proper resort was
to the established grievance procedure rather than self-help. Having
established the norm of industrial conduct, Professor Laskin prescribed damages for the breach :

The evolution of collective bargaining under legislative encouragement and sanction, and the introduction of self-government in industry through collective agreements containing their own machinery
for enforcement, have invited, and, in fact, demanded, sobering responsibility by employers and trade unions . Part of that responsibility
lies in a duty to redress established breaches of their collective engagements . The very prospect of having to answer for a breach is,
211 Re Canadian
General Electric Co . and Local 507 United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers (1951), 2 Lab. Arb. Cas . 608, 3 Lab. Arb.
Cas . 1090 (Cent. Ont . Ind . Rel . Inst . pub.) ; Re Polymer Corp . Ltd. and
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l. Union, Local 16-14 and Oil etc .
Union, Technicians (1958), 10 Lab. Arb. Cas . 31, at p . 51 .
212 (1951), 2 Lab. Arb. Cas . 608, at p. 609 .
213 Ibid., at p. 611.
214 It is this holding that appears to be the most vulnerable part of the
decision, since a party to a contract who procures the other's breach
should not then be heard to complain of it. Regarding the, collective agreement not as a contract, but rather as a constitutional document, see infra,
Professor Laskin's holding is more acceptable.
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or should be, a factor in securing adherence to obligations voluntarily
assumed ."'

The decision surely implies enforcement of responsible citizenship
in "self-government in industry" in addition to recompense for a
contractual breach .
In the Polymer decision, faced with a,substantially similar nostrike clause, Professor Laskin refused, as in the C.G.E. award,
to impose automatic liability for any strike during the term of the
agreement. He likewise declined the other extreme of holding liability only where there was an "official" strike. What he did decide
was that responsibility rested with the union officers for terminating
a "wildcat" strike which they did not, admittedly, initiate by (i)
removing the shop stewards and committeemen from leadership
of the stoppage, and (ii) urging the men to return to work. He
carefully disavowed any unreasonable demand upon the shop
stewards to spontaneously turn their backs on their co-workers .
Nor need higher union officials have refrained from normal expression of views on the dispute which provoked the strike, either
to the union's regular meeting or to the company, despite a potentially inflammatory effect . Again, he suggested that the validity
of the grievance which provoked the strike has no bearing upon
liability.
Finally, following the C.G.E. decision, he rejected the notion
that the power to award damages must be expressly found in the
collective agreement :
Such a view, apart from all other considerations, expresses a very
rudimentary understanding of the processes of adjudication more
appropriate to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries than to the twentieth."'

It is clear that if arbitrators are to award damages for strikes in
breach of a no-strike clause, these two cases represent the outer
limits of liability. Any showing that the union more actively
furthered the strike would, ipso facto, give the company an arbitrable claim for compensation .257
Two lessons are suggested by these cases. First of all Professor
Laskin clearly considers the strike a potent weapon not lightly to
Supra, footnote 252, (1951), 3 Lab . Arb . Cas ., at p . 1094 .
But cf. Colonial Provision Co . (1952), 17 (U.S .) L .A . 610 ; BaldwinLima-Hamilton Corp. (1958), 30 (U.S .) L .A. 1061 (jurisdiction to award
damages denied) .
257
For some United States examples, see Motor Haulage Co., Inc .
(1947), 6 (U .S .) L.A . 720, aff'd . (1947), 7 (U .S .) L.A . 953 ; Brynmore Press,
Inc . (1947), 7 (U .S .) L .A . 648 . Professor Laskin's decisions appear unique
in Canada .
255
256
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be employed for temporary advantage in minor matters."' Secondly, the parties having created for themselves a regime of industrial
justice with its own tribunals administering the common law of
the shop, they must accept the full implications of this system and
live by it. Professor Laskin's language is neither a literal adherence
to the broad statutory,,~ban on all strikes, nor the conceptualistic
judicial imposition of liability for all interference with or breach
of contract . Until the courts familiarize themselves with the realities
of labour relations, the'parties may prefer to resort to self-imposed
and self-administered regulation?b 9 Seen in this light, Professor
Laskin's decisions''do not merely indicate a more -9ophisticated
handling of the facts in labour litigation . They may represent pioneering navigation through troubled waters between the courts
(which can give relief but often do not understand the problems)
and the Labour Board (which understands the problems but cannot
make the struck employer whole) . At least his decisions are some:
evidence of a felt need for adjudication of this type ."'
IX. Conclusion : The Sources of Difficulty,
and Some Suggestions .

Though the cases imposing liability for strikes in Canada are few,,
they raise problems which are today primarily jurisprudential, but
with a change tomorrow in the power position of unions are of
potential social and economic significance . If we look first at what

268
Cf. "Strikes are costly to workers as they are to' management. In.
normal times an occasional deliberate test of strength by strikes on matters.
of major importance may be necessary and desirable . The anticipated
victory is then deemed to be worthy of the cost. But wanton and needless
use of the strike weapon weakens the weapon itself, casts undue burden
on the workers, and threatens to destroy their organization ." Shulman,
Umpire, Ford Motor Co. & U.A . W., (opinion A-151, 1944), quoted in
Cox, Labor Law (4th ed., 1958), p. 665.
gas The present Ontario legislation (Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O .,
1950, c. 341, s. 3(3), Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., 1950, c. 194, s 32(5) )
is a bar to actions in the courts for enforcement of collective agreement
provisions, and enforcement of arbitration awards must apparently be:
by penal sanctions (Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., 1950, c. 194, s. 61(1) )_
But see Re Int'l. Nickel Co . of Canada Ltd., and Rivando, (19561 O.R. 379 ,
(C.A.) (certiorari to an arbitration board as a statutory tribunal) . At thetime of writing, the Ontario legislature has given two readings to a bill}
which will make labour arbitration awards enforceable (and thus, perhaps,
reviewable) in the Supreme Court. In any case, the threat to strike or
inducing a strike during the currency of the agreement has been regarded
as tortious,
see supra .
260 As
further evidence, the merits of a recent strike on the issue of
feather-bedding were arbitrated by Professor Laskin after an injunction
had been issued. Toronto Daily Star, April 7th, 1959. And see Re Canadian
Gypsum and Nova Scotia Quarryworkers (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 319
(N.S.S.C.). (arbitration re propriety of discharge of strikers for acts of
violence) .
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the judges do rather than what they say, liability is seldom imposed for strikes which conform to the procedural requirements
and which seek by legal means to achieve legal ends . 2s 1 Perhaps it
is too much to ask more because the judges are labouring under
physical, institutional, and analytical difficulties . But an examination of these difficulties may yield some guide for clearer expression,
and safeguard against future unfortunate decisions.
A. Physical Difficulties.

Canadian courts are handicapped by a shortage of indigenous
legal experience in labour matters. In absolute terms, the case load
is very small, and legal writing in labour law is almost nonexistent .262 This means that the courts are unused to dealing with
the strike problem in context, that they often lack socio-economic
expertness and labour relations empathy and that they are not
constantly called upon to revise and refine their doctrines. Practitioners in the labour field, too, are a small group 26 s and often lack
prolonged experience in labour relations. This means that the presentation and decision of cases is fax more of an ad hoc process,
which in turn creates a deep-rooted conviction (at least in labour
ranks) that the law and lawyers are incapable of handling labour
relations .264
B. Institutional Difficulties.

The social context of Canadian labour relations produces anomalies in public and judicial attitudes, and in the legislative framework itself. For various reasons, Canadian labour prior to World
War II was peculiarly unassertive .211 The economic expansion of
the country during the last two decades, however, has been the
occasion for the rise of a powerful labour movement pitted against
well-entrenched capital in a more ideological, if less violent, version
of the American experience . 266 The stresses on judges trying honestly
261 It was not always so . See Part II : The Strike at Common Law before
the Labour Relations Acts .
262 The Canadian Annual Digest ("every Canadian case") lists for 1946 :
3 picketing and 1 strike cases ; for 1956 : 7 picketing and 2 strike cases,
(both civil and criminal) . An examination of English-language legal
periodicals in Canada shows about ten articles on all aspects of Canadian
labour law for each of the two periods 1943-6 and 1955-8 .
263 See Carrothers, op .
cit., supra, footnote 246, Introduction, Table A,
at p . xxvi.
264 E.g. Harvey, History of the Trade Union Movement in Canada,
Special Lectures, Law Society of Upper Canada (1954), p . 21 et seqq .
265 Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (1955), Ch . 1 . Logan, State
Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining (1956), p . 77 .
266 Jamieson, op . cit., ibid. See also Jamieson, Industrial Relations and
Government Policy, op . cit ., supra, footnote 92 ; and Labour Problems of
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to maintain what they conceive to be the proper balance of power
are obvious . As if to complicate the matter, there is abundant
opinion 267 that the distinctive Canadian legislative contributioncompulsory conciliation-serves only to aggravate the strikes it is
designed to avoid. The gist of this contention is that the promotion
of collective bargaining may often be inconsistent with government
intervention to prevent strikes or maintain a static balance of
economic power. All of this means that when a strike does erupt
and ultimately finds its way to court in a civil action, the judge is
really being called upon to adjudicate a complex of social, economic, and psychological conflicts ofwhich he may be totally unsuspecting . Nor, in the more positivistic Canadian legal tradition,
is he liable to be informed of these matters by Brandeis brief or
judicial notice ."" He sees before him only an individual plaintiff
seeking redress, whose claim is couched in the traditional phraseology of the common law: "rights" and "unlawful acts" . This is
misleading. In fact, what the unions seek is not so much a form of
the traditional wage bargain as a distribution of power embodied
in a form of industrial constitution. Given this objective, the usual
contractual assumptions of higgling in the marketplace and the
expectations of commercial dealings are not appropriate, nor are
the legal rules developed primarily to govern sudh dealings . "' In
the United States, the courts are apparently reasonably to be expected to accommodate their thinking to new social situations .
Thus a call for a "modern Mansfield" to bring within the judicial
grasp the institution of labour arbitration .270 It may well be that
Canada, too, requires a "modern Mansfield" to put the law back
in touch with social realities, for it is this accentuated gap between
the social phenomenon and the litigated case that underlies the
analytical difficulties .
an Expanding Economy (1954), 20 C.J .E.P.S. 141. "Strikes, like risk and
obsolescence, may be an unavoidable cost in an expanding economy."
267 Jamieson, op. cit., supra, footnote 92, at pp. 25-6 ; Woods, Canadian
Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement Policy : an Appraisal (1955),
21 C.J.E.P.S . 447 ; Phillips, Government Conciliation in Labour Disputes
(1956), 22 C.J.E.P.S. 523 ; Logan, op. cit ., supra, footnote 265, p. 83 ;
Jamieson, op. cit ., supra, footnote 265, pp. 102, 113-4 ; Levinson, Compulsory Conciliation Machinery in.Ontario (1958),1 Osgoode Hall L.S.J. 47.
268 In the absence of a constitutional right to jury, that institution has
fallen into almost total disuse (and, of course, was never available in injunction proceedings) . Thus, even this most tenuous method of keeping
the common law in touch with the climate of social opinion is lost. See
Merlon! v. Acme Construction (1959), 43 M.P.R. 123 (N.B .C.A .).
269
Jamieson, Industrial Relations and Government Policy, op. cit.,
supra,
footnote 93, at p . 25 .
27°
Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincohz
Mills Case (1959), 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1058, at p. 1059.
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C. Analytical Difficulties .
As do many of our other institutions, Canadian labour law
appears to draw upon both the English and American experience .
Our statute law (save for the conciliation addendum) is based
upon the Wagner Act."' Our case law, however, depends heavily
upon the British cases (especially the older British cases) . And,
as has been pointed out, there are indigenous features of Canadian labour relations which make unwarranted too ready analogies
to either country. Positing that legal rules reflect social assumptions, it appears that the legislation, cases, and attitudes cannot
be squared.
Four basic social attitudes towards collective bargaining have
been advanced as descriptive : (i) repression, (ii) toleration, (iii)
encouragement, and (iv) intervention ."' The English position is
toleration: government confines itself to policing, protecting property rights (tangible and intangible), and preventing violence . The
philosophy is laissez-faire, and the protection of the law is extended to individuals (human and corporate) as against combinations (e.g. unions) with greater or lesser notions of the economic
equities .21' The American position is encouragement : collective
bargaining is promoted by the government, workers are protected
in their rights to organize and bargain, and the strike weapon may
be used in aid of bargaining . Public policy has set outside limits
on about what and how bargaining shall be conducted, and enforcement is by an administrative agency . The Canadian attitude
partakes of both and also involves a measure of intervention to
settle the dispute and avoid a strike if at all possible . These attitudes are not merely formal, but go to the heart of the substantive
rules.
Canadian courts frequently resort to the classical English
trilogy-Mogul, Quinn, and Sorrell-as authority for the existence of a "right to trade' %274 The very phrase poses two major
difficulties : the jurisprudential value of such an analysis, and its
271 Logan, op. cit., supra, footnote 265, at pp . 26-8 lists other differences,
largely administrative and procedural .
2'z
Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (4th . ed .,
1936), pp . 374-6 .
273 The
more anomolous inequities of the common law have been
statutorily redressed . See e .g. Trade Disputes Act, (1906), 6 Edw. VII,
c. 47 . Lalande, The Status of Organized Labour (1941), 19 Can . Bar Rev .
638 ; Laskin, Picketing : a Comparison of Certain Canadian and American
Doctrines (1937), 15 Can . Bar Rev . 10.
274 Kennedy and Finkelman, op . cit ., supra, footnote 23 . The Canadian
cases persist in discussion of the "right to earn a living" and the "right to
carry on business", see infra.
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economic implications . Since the statutory acceptance of collective bargaining, Canadian cases have seldom produced a direct
verbal clash between the "right to trade" and the "right to strike".
The clash has been averted sometimes because the happy admixture
of picketing in the strike situation provided a toehold for liability ; 27 s
in other cases, the one "right" or the other has been conveniently
ignored ; 276 in still other cases, the "right to strike" has been divested by contract or statute, 2T (whether or not the courts advert
to this) . But the fact remains that there is no absolute "right to
trade""' which may indicate that there is no "right" at all."' As
Dean Wright suggests, the clash of two absolute rights could only
produce a legal impossibility."' Unembarrassed by their good
fortune in avoiding such an impasse, the courts continue to talk
in terms they obviously do not literally mean : the right to enter
into and enjoy contracts"' which may be violated by unjustified
interference ; 282 the rights of a British subject to earn a living in his
own way; 283 the right to refuse to supply labour (but not necessarily
to withdraw it) ; 284 the right to strike (but not to prevent others
from working) ;"' the statutory and contractual right to have
labour supplied ; 286 the right of union members in a union shop
to engage in work there free from improper interference from
union officers ; 287 the statutory right to join or to refuse to join a
union; 288 the right of the union to protect the interests of its members ; 289 and the right to warn of the difficulties of employing nonop . cit., supra, footnote 246, at pp. 47-61, 90-4.
Newell v . Barker, supra, footnote 138, ignores the "right to trade" ;
Fokuhl v. Raymond, supra, footnote 137, ignores the "right to strike" .
117 Southam v . Gouthro, supra, footnote 75 ; Body v. Murdoch, supra,
footnote
229, Therien v . Teamsters, supra, footnote 66.
278 Kennedy and Finkelman, op. cit ., supra, footnote 23, p. 113 .
276
276

Carrothers,

Stone, Province and Function of Law (1947), pp. 625-6.
Op . cit., supra, footnote 177, p. 865 .
Fokuhl v . Raymond, supra, footnote 138 ; Hammer v . Kemmis, supra,
footnote 125.
282 Quinn v . Leathem, supra, footnote 102, cited in Fokuhl v . Raymond,
supra, footnote 137 ; Smith Bros. Construction v . Tones, Nos . I & 2, supra,
footnote 75 ; Body v. Murdoch, supra, footnote 229 ; Bevaart v. Flecher,
supra, footnote 46 ; Tunney v. Orchard, (19571 S.C .R. 436, (1957), 8
D.L.R. (2d) 273 .
283 Quinn v. Leathem, ibid . ; Therien v. Teamsters, supra, footnote 66;
Seaboard Owners v. Cross, supra, footnote 42 ; Tunney v. Orchard, ibid.
279
280
281

u Therien v . Teamsters, ibid.
2
285 Lyons v. Wilkins, supra, footnote

footnote 75.
286
287
288
281

186 ;

Southam v . Gouthro, supra,

Canada Overseas Shipping v. Kake, supra, footnote 201 .
Tunney v . Orchard, supra, footnote 282 .
Therien v . Teamsters, supra, footnote 66.
Newell v . Barker, supra, footnote 138 ; Fokuhl v . Raymond, supra,

footnote 137 .

396

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[VOL . XXXVIII

union men.299 One can only surmise that the "rights" of which the
courts speak are the legal results they have decided to impose . 291
Without riding the right-rule-remedy merry-go-round so
brilliantly constructed by Professor Fuller in his "Case of the
Interrupted Whambler",292 it at least seems clear that the decision
to impose liability, to vindicate a "right", is essentially a policy
decision . In a field like labour relations, this may not only be
inevitable, but desirable . However, to predict the outcome of lawsuits it is necessary to know what motivates the policymaker, and to
evaluate his decision it is necessary to know what the policy ought
to be. Canadian cases do not make this clear. A court presented
with the problem of a subcontractor dismissed as a result of union
pressure would purport to decide whether or not there was a
conspiracy to injure, as in Newell, or interference with contractual
rights, as in Fokuhl, or unlawful interference with the right to
earn one's living, as in Therien . This tells us nothing except the
result . Surely liability would better be decided by examining
whether the plaintiff has some interest worthy of protection, having regard to the economic implications of collective bargaining,'"
whether the defendant (union or union officer) was primarily
furthering a personal grudge or a predetermined policy,294 whether
that policy ran afoul of a statutory standard,"' whether the kind
of pressure exerted was condemned by statute or otherwise
tortious,299 and whether to give or deny relief is the more conNewell v. Barker, ibid.
Stone, op. cit., supra, footnote 279, pp . 121-2 gives a Hohfeldian
analysis of the confusion of "rights" and "privileges" in Quinn, Mogul,
and Allen . But cf. Holmes, The Common Law (1946), p . 214 .
292 Fuller, Problems of Jurisprudence (1949), p . 628 . This fictional suit
"for a poultice" as a remedy for interruption of the "right to whamble"
contains five judgments, each of which represents a different formulation
of the relationship between rules, rights and remedies . Lest the reader be
persuaded by the logic of any of the judgments, Professor Fuller suggests
that the case be read once translating "whambling" as union-organizing,
and then a second time, translating it as "union-discouraging" .
293 See e .g. Rand J . in Newell v . Barker . "The market of labour is,
therefore, restricted by considerations of competing interests which are
now part of the accepted modes of action of individuals and groups .",
supra, footnote 138, at p . 398 (S .C .R.) .
291 Fokuhl v . Raymond, supra, footnote 137 ; Dewar v . Divan, supra,
footnote 227.
M E.g ., makework strike (S .B .C., 1954, c . 17, s . 5(2) ) ; violation of the
Canada Shipping Act (Seaboard Owners v. Cross, supra, footnote 42 ;
Canada Overseas Shipping v. Kake, supra, footnote 201) ; violation of
anti-trust legislation (cf. Allen Bradley v . I .B .E. W. (1945), 325 U.S . 797) ;
violation of compulsory arbitration provision of Labour Relations Act
(Therien v. Teamsters, in S .C .C ., supra, footnote 37 .)
296 Therien v . Teamsters, ibid. To avoid circular reasoning, "tortious"
in this context would have to refer to conduct commonly held actionable
in non-labour cases (e.g. assault, defamation), since what is sought are
296

29,
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sistent with what the court understands to be the collective bargaining regime . In a very rough way, this was the technique o¬
the Smith Bros. Construction and Therien cases.
To refine these standards, the example of a premature strike
may be useful . On the surface, the syllogism is easy : all strikes before conciliation (or during the agreement) are statute-barred ; to
do (or procure others to do) what is statute-barred is unlawful ;
those who act unlawfully may be liable for (i) a conspiracy to do
unlawful acts, (ii) unlawful interference with another's rights, or
(iii) an actionable breach of the statute. If literal adherence to the
statute is worth this much, perhaps one ought not to quibble
about the name under which liability is imposed . But should it
matter that the strike is provoked by the employer's own breach
of contract? by an unfair labour practice? Perhaps the employer
should be estopped from complaining of an injury he has brought
upon himself. Should it matter that .conciliation has bogged down
because of the employer's delay? or that the report has been held
back for weeks? Conciliation, after all, is to vindicate the public
interest in industrial peace and resort to the process is secured by
the threat of prosecution. When the employer himself has disrupted the process or it has broken down of its own weight, is the
public interest furthered by compensating the employer for his
own wrong or for acts done after the purpose of the statute has
already been frustrated?"' Does picketing necessarily involve an
invitation to strike illegally because the picket line is sure to be
respected? Or does it merely constitute free speech to the public
or employees on the job, who may then act upon their own convictions? The recent trend"" towards liability for picketing as
procuring an illegal strike, if followed, would restrict picketing to
employees legally on strike and thus deprive labour of a traditionally important organizational technique. Before finding the
picketers liable, a court might well consider if the employer does

standards divorced from the traditional judicial attitude towards labour
disputes .
297 American cases dealing with strikes called prematurely in violation
of National Labor Relations Act, s. 8(d) appear to be influenced by such
considerations. See Mastro Plastics Corp . v. N.L .R .P .. (1956), 350 U.S.
270 ; N.L .R .B. v. Lion Oil (1957), 352 U.S. 282 .'But see Hammer v. Kemmis
supra, footnote 125 and Tuomi v. 'Carpenters (1953), 2 Can. Lab: Serv..
76-387, contra .
298 Smith Bros . Construction v. Jones No . I ; supra, footnote 75 ; Pacific-

Western Planing Mills v . International Woodworkers Association etc . ;
Bennett and White v. Van Reeder,, Merloni v. Acme Construction. supra,.
footnote 46, Cf. Pappas v . Stacey (1955), 151 Me. 36, 116 A. 2d. 497 (in-junction against organizational picketing), Park & Tilford v. Teamsters-

(1946), 27 Cal. 2d. 599, 165 P. 2d. 891 (refused injunction against organizational picketing) .
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not have both legal and self-help remedies against illegal strikers
and does not really require the protection of law to wage his
battle .29s
It is submitted that to attach automatic civil liability to economic strikes for failure to observe what often amounts to a merely
formal compliance with the statutory conditions precedent is to
make the Labour Relations Act a trap : compulsory collective
bargaining is the bait with which the union is lured into the statutory scheme, only to be stripped of immunity for acts which were
not formerly considered actionable. That the Act must have
penal teeth to enforce obedience is at once conceded . But that
these teeth should be available to redress the garden-variety losses
of economic warfare is too much to assume without express legislative consideration.
The fault is not entirely that of the courts . The legislation is
silent on many matters : jurisdictional disputes, secondary pressures, picketing, uncertified unions and the effect to be given to
their contracts and the scope of pressure they may employ . To
continue legislative silence is to invite the judges to make policy ."'
It is only when the judges can speak with conviction on what
public policy is that they can intelligently avoid the improper
interest-balancing of which they are frequently accused."' Even
given legislation, public policy has thus far been vindicated by
penal sanctions and would likely continue to be so in the future .
This type of formulation does not solve the courts' problem: it
merely points to the further question of whether damages should
be awarded. The enactment in the United States of sections 301
and 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act is a legislative determination
that breaches of the collective agreement and injuries due to
211 The problem arises, typically, in the construction
industry where
union conditions are especially vulnerable to attack by unorganizable
immigrant labour, and where certification, bargaining, and conciliation
(even where an appropriate unit could be defined) would take far longer
than the job itself, a problem to which the courts seem insensitive. See,
e .g. Merlon! v. Acme Construction, supra, footnote 46.
3o, See, e .g. the conflicting inferences as to the legitimacy of recognition
strikes drawn by Davey J.A . in Hammer v . Keminis, supra, footnote 125,
and Ritchie J . in Merloni v . Acme Construction, !bid.
301 A s Holmes notes : "No concrete proposition is self-evident, no matter
how ready we may be to accept it, not even Mr . Herbert Spencer's every
man has a right to do what he wills, provided he interferes not with a
like right on the part of his neighbours ." The Path of the Law (189.6-7),
10 Harv. L. Rev . 457, at p . 466. For Canadian appeals for an appreciation
of the interest-balancing nature of labour law, see Carrothers, Recent
Developments in the Tort Law of Picketing (1957), 35 Can . Bar Rev .
1005, at p. 1011 ; Laskin, op . cit ., supra, footnote 273, at pp . 19-20 . Case
and Comment, (1942), 20 Can . Bar Rev . 636, at p . 637 ; Finkelman, The
Law of Picketing in Canada (1937-8), 2 U.T.L .J. 66, at pp. 66-8.
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specified objectionable practices deserve compensation . This solution, while inflexible, has the virtue of clarity, and represents a
considered public judgment upon loss-distribution arising from
the clash of social forces . This is quite a different notion than the
usual Canadian judicial view of private litigation . Canadian legislatures might well be advised to articulate similar standards for
the courts . If, however, this is not politically feasible, it remains
for some part of the judicial hierarchy to set its face against what
is submitted to be an unhelpful mode of analysis . The Supreme
Court of Canada is the logical candidate. It is unembarrassed by
a backlog of labour cases, and has shown a creative bent in . recent
years ."' Hopefully, the court might point the way for the provincial courts towards a mode of analysis similar to the prima facie
tort doctrine, and, indeed, may have begun to do so in the Therien
case. (By way of caveat, it should be noted that Newell v. Barker
has never been cited by a provincial court, and serious inroads
have been made on Williams v. Artistocratic Restaurants) . 3 oa
A further jurisprudential objection must be raised to the present resort by Canadian courts to English authority. The practice
impedes a case-to-case refinement of the Canadian law. It is far
easier to resort to dicta and reason deductively from a general
"right to trade" to the vindication of a particular plaintiff's right,
than to pursue the reverse mental process, more traditional in the
common law."'
The second main objection to resort to the English cases is
that they are based on a different experience with labour relations
and different notions of economic policy. There has been little
examination in Canada of the propriety of applying these cases,
which again may reflect our positivistic attitude towards law. Some
beginnings have been made, to be sure . Professor Carrothers,
in discussing the Canadian application of Thomson v. Deakin,
points to the rarity of union-led strikes in England at the time of
the case which enabled the union fairly to argue that an adverse
decision :
. . . would make illegal the use of the strike weapon in a country where
a charge of abuse cannot reasonably be levied and where there being
strictly speaking no compulsory collective bargaining . . . the right to
302 For an exhortation to the court to "discharge
a creative role of
law-making through constant re-examination of previously accepted
doctrine", see Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada : A Final Court of
and for Canadians (1951), 29 Can . Bar Rev . 1038, at p . 1074.
303 See Carrothers, Recent Developments in the
Tort Law of Picketing,
op. cit ., supra, footnote 301 .
301 Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (1922), p . 23 .

40 0

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[VOL. XXXVIII

strike is of singular importance to the welfare of the trade union
movement and the persons in whose interests the movement functions." ,

But if Thomson v. Deakin-a 1952 decision-is out of joint
with Canadian labour relations, what of Quinn v. Leathem, Allen
v. Flood, and the rest, relics of the turn-of-the-century philosophy
of laissez faire economics? That line of authority is based on the
notion of the freedom of individuals to aggregate the factors of
production in a competitive market governed by the laws of supply and demand. Combination and concerted union action is seen
to thwart both the liberty of the worker to sell his labour, and of
the employer to buy it-"' Yet, even in England, the "right to trade"
appears to have withered on the vine. Friedmann notes that
The Harris Tweed case not only shows more clearly than any previous decision the elusiveness of the ideal of freedom of trade, it demonstrates also the evolution which economic individualism has undergone in the last fifty years-the development from an almost pure
Benthamism to a position where economic groups struggle with each
other, with authority looking on as an umpire who attempts to interfere little and to be impartia1.117

But to no avail. Laissez faire is as clearly visible throughout
Fokuhl v. Raymond and Therien v. Teamsters (in the lower courts)
as in the earlier English (and Canadian) cases, of which it has
been said that they regarded laissezfaire as a legal rule rather than
a political maxim ."'
In Fokuhl, Laidlaw J.A. makes much of the fact that Raymond,
the international organizer, ordered plaintiff's employees off the
job, although there was no dispute between them, and although
(as was held) there were no comprehensible grounds of dispute
between Fokuhl and Raymond ."' In other words, the free exercise
of the right to sell one's labour was interfered with . He also stresses
the fact that to fulfill his contractual obligations, plaintiff depended upon the services of employees who were members of the
union."' Raymond interfered with his access to the labour market .
He then resorts to Mogul v. McGregor to show that it is only in
pursuit of his own competing interests that Raymond might
Carrothers op . cit ., supra, footnote 246, p . 83 .
Finkelman, op. cit ., supra, footnote 301, at p. 355 ; Carrothers,
op . cit., ibid., pp . 24-5 ; Hedges and Winterbottom, Legal History of Trade
Unionism (1930), pp. 134-5 ; Commons, op . cit ., supra, footnote 196,
pp. 298-306 .
307 Friedman, op .
cit., supra, footnote 97, at p . 2 ; cf. Cox, op. cit.,
supra, footnote 177.
303 Finkelman, op . cit ., supra, footnote 301, at p . 355 (see cases cited
therein at footnote 95) .
310 Ibid., at p . 155 .
209 Supra, footnote 137, at p . 154 .
305
106
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interfere without liability. As the learned judge so pointedly
remarks
. . . Raymond, acting as International Vice-President of the Union,

presumed to assert a right to decide conclusively that the respondent
did not possess proper qualifications or standing in his trade to make
a contract with Austin company, and for that reason to forbid the
parties to continue their contractual relations . It is simply inconceivable to me that any officer or officers of a trade union, or any
other person or persons, without lawful authority, should attempt to
exercise such a right . Every person is entitled to enter into whatever
lawful contracts he may choose to make, with any other person or
persons who are willing to make an agreement with him, providing
such person or persons are not disqualified by law ." 1

Although by no means essential to the decision in Therien v.
Teamsters, one cannot but be struck by the many references to
the words of Lord Lindley in Quinn v. Leathem
As to the plaintiff's rights . He had the ordinary rights of a British
subject . He was at liberty to earn his living in his own way, provided
he did not violate some special law . . . , and provided he did not infringe the rights of other people . This liberty involved liberty to deal
with other persons who were willing to deal with him . This liberty
is a right recognized by law . . . .312

Without defending the abuses of power by either Raymond or
the Teamsters, these and similar dicta simply do not present a
true picture of contemporary economic man. Individualism has
given way to corporatism, in both labour and management,"'
and competition to oligopoly . 314
Even if the repudiation of Benthamism had not taken place in
the English cases, it would still be improper for Canadian courts
to use the "right to trade" cases and ignore their statutory re
pudiation in England ."' Indeed, these cases may be considered
inferentially repudiated by modern collective bargaining legislation ."' The Labour Relations Acts are inconsistent with the
traditional notion of individual labour transactions at any level,
and encourage labour activity designed to take wages out of
all Ibid., at pp . 158-9 .

312 [1901] A .C .
495, at p . 534, quoted in (1959), 27 W.W .R. (N .S.) at
p. 57, per DesBrisay C .J .B.C., at pp. 66-7, per Davey J .A.
313 Rand,
Responsibility of Labour Unions, op . cit., supra, footnote 6,
pp. 41-2 ; Gregory, Labor and the Law (1st ed ., 1948), pp . 416-20.
314 See e .g. Commons, The Economics of Collective Action (1950),
ch. xvii ; Gregory, Labor and the Law (2d . ed., 1958), p. 514 .
315 Laskin, op .
cit., supra, footnote 273 ; Lalande, op . cit ., supra, footnote
273, at p . 677.
315 Which has
been called a "most gallant, if Quixotic, invasion of
laissezfaire", Ward, The Economics of Collective Action (1940), 53 Harv .
L. Rev. 754 .
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competition altogether."' In a sense, of course, the legislation
presupposes a labour market, but one upon which sellers and
buyers are put in a position of substantial parity."" This parity is
achieved because the union stands between the employer and the
labour market . The obligation of an employer to sit down and
bargain with a union at all, and especially to surrender many of
his "rights" to run his business as he sees fit, would have been as
unacceptable in England sixty years ago as the helplessness of the
individual worker in modern Canadian industrialism . If Canadian
judges cannot be accused of bias (conscious or otherwise)"' in imposing liability for strikes, at least they are often guilty of uncritical adherence to standards of a bygone age .
To the extent to which the Canadian courts are irretrievably
committed to their present doctrines, parties may come to litigate
labour disputes in other forums, better equipped and more in
clined to deal sensitively with delicate policy issues . Arbitration,
as has been suggested,"' may offer one such forum. A more effective Labour Board may offer another."' As presently provided in
Ontario, the Board's only sanction is feeble indeed (a declaration
of an unlawful strike under section 59), and the courts have quite
properly refused to regard the Board's jurisdiction as exclusive ."'
But a scheme of legislation which would channel disputes through
the Labour Board-at least in the first instance-could achieve
a maximum of uniformity of result and foster the expertness that
may develop from repeated handling of like cases. This could be
achieved either by a common-law rule requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit, or by
311 Syndicat Catholique v.
Compagnie Paquet (1959), 18 D .L .R. (2d)
346 (S.C.C.) .
318 But see Cox, op . cit., supra, footnote 77, at pp . 322-3 . "The Wagner
Act became law on the floodtide of the belief that the conflicting interests
. . . can be adjusted only by private negotiation, backed, if necessary, by
economic weapons, without the intervention of law . . . . Congress turned
to the policy of relying for the adjustment of industrial conflicts upon
negotiation between employers and labour organizations strong enough
to bargain effectively on behalf of employees . . . ."
as Laskin, op. cit ., supra, footnote 13, at p . 780 ; Laskin, op . cit., supra,
footnote 181, at p . 298 ; Finkelman, op. cit ., supra, footnote 301, at pp .
67-9 ; Case and Comment, (1937), 15 Can . Bar Rev . 106, at p . 111 ; Some
Aspects of Industrial Disputes (1938), 16 Can . Bar Rev. 286, at p . 290 .
320 See supra, VIII : Arbitration An Alternative to Litigation.
321 This
would necessarily involve power to issue cease and desist
orders, and the expansion of both legal and labour relations personnel
to undertake more vigorous activities . See Bill 74, 1960, (Ont .), providing
for enforcement of certain Ontario Labour Relations Board orders in
the courts.
322 Oakville
Wood Specialties v. Mustin, General Dry Batteries Ltd. v .
Brigenshaw, Hallnor Mines v. Behie, Smith Bros . Construction v . Jones
No . 2 ., supra, footnote 44.
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requiring the Board to consent in writing to civil suit as it now
must do to prosecutions for offences under the Act."'

$21 R .S .O., 1950, c . 194, s . 65, am . S .O ., 1957, c . 57, s. 8(1) . This may
raise constitutional queries as to whether the Labour Board would become
a court requiring federal appointment under the British North America
Act, s . 96 .

